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Abstract

This thesis attempts to analyze one of the gravest humanitarian challenges of our time, the
refugee crisis, and make it accessible. After beginning with some definitional terms, the paper
describes refugee policies in seven countries with distinctly different resources and legacies of
hosting refugees to determine the state regulations and programs that those countries have relied
upon in the past. The countries involved include the haven countries of Kenya and Uganda, the
coastal nation of Italy, the inland European countries of Germany and Hungary, and the North
American countries of the USA and Canada. All of these countries are scrutinized based on their
previous and current institutions, the author’s personal experiences with them, and contemporary
literature on refugee hosting. Based on this information, the author offers recommendations for
refugee hosting policy to each of these nations and considers the importance of four-part
coordination: international coordination, national government coordination, NGO (nongovernmental organization) involvement and the private sector, on state-based refugee policies.
The paper’s recommendations will be based on ratified international legislation, centralization of
hosting, programs based on education, vocational training, employment, and naturalization, and
unique factors relevant to each host country.
Keywords: refugee, resettlement, policymaking, institution, NGO, Kenya, Uganda, Italy,
Germany, Hungary, USA, Canada, centralization, human rights, naturalization.
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Identifying Better Refugee Policies for an Evolving Crisis
Refugee hosting has been a global challenge since the end of the Second World War.
After one of the most devastating conflicts the world has ever seen, the world was tasked with
hosting millions of Jews fleeing Nazi Germany. A top comprehensive policymaking body , the
United Nations, led the charge in developing refugee resettlement. In December 14, 1950, the
United Nations formed a new agency called the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and gave it the mandate to provide for the protection of refugees and
forcibly displaced people and assist in their voluntary repatriation, local assimilation or
resettlement to a third country.1 Soon thereafter, the UNHCR drafted the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which defined the term “refugee” and identified the rights
granted to refugees based on the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, until
1967, the Refugee Convention carried the caveat that refugees could only be granted status as a
result of events occurring before 1951.2 With the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, the geographical and temporal restrictions on refugee status were removed so that all
those fleeing persecution with sufficient grounds for asylum can be granted refugee status. To
this day, 145 countries have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and 146 countries have
ratified the 1967 Refugee Protocol.
Despite this initial display of international consensus, subsequent years have proven that
refugee repatriation, and hosting through integration or resettlement, are far more complex than
was previously anticipated. In 2011, the Arab Spring, a series of protests, uprisings, and coups in
the Middle East, left millions of people stateless and seeking to flee their countries. In particular,

1
“Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.” United States High
Commission for Refugees, July 1996. https://www.unhcr.org/4d944e589.pdf.
2
UN General Assembly. “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.” RefWorld. United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, July 28, 1951. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html.
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the Syrian Civil War in 2011 led to such destabilization within the country that many began to
call the following mass exodus “the Syrian refugee crisis.” General international guidelines were
in place to share the responsibility of hosting newly displaced persons, but the actual
international responses to the crisis were disparate and uncertain. Some nations welcomed
refugees with open arms, while others shut down their borders. Some nations presented
comprehensive policies and programs to host fleeing populations, while others offered very little
in the way of support. This thesis will highlight some of the different refugee policies and
national programs utilized by different countries in reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis and offer
recommendations based on past policy, international legislation, hosting capacity, and
contemporary literature on refugee policy. The paper intends to offer a variety of solutions for
very different national programs, ranging from haven countries such as Kenya and Uganda, to
European countries such as Italy, Germany, and Hungary, and concluding with the overseas
resettlement of the United States and Canada. The author’s hope is that these policy
recommendations can offer some insight into refugee hosting to allow countries to participate in
this international imperative without overburdening their respective nations and allowing
refugees to properly integrate and contribute to local economies. The refugee crisis is everchanging and the world must adapt with it.
However, before entering the intricate field of policy, it’s important to define some basic
terms and distinctions upon which this thesis will rely heavily moving forward. The first terms to
distinguish are the identities of the people who are the subject of this paper, as it primarily
pertains to resettled refugees. The 1951 Refugee Convention defined the term refugee as
someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin “owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
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social group, or political opinion.”3 The UNHCR definition is broadly accepted in international
law and instituted in the refugee programs of countries that have ratified the 1951 Refugee
Convention. Refugees are individuals fleeing conflict or strife in their home countries on the
basis of persecution within the five specified categories listed above. Once an individual has
been granted asylum in a country and received recognition as someone escaping persecution,
they are considered a refugee or asylee.
Refugees are often conflated with a second term, asylum seekers. The UNHCR defines
asylum seekers as individuals “whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed.”4 Asylum
seekers have not yet been granted asylum, but are seeking refugee status in a country on the basis
of persecution. Before anyone can be called a refugee, they must first be asylum seekers.
However, governments do not grant asylum seekers the same protections as refugees, as their
applications have not yet been accepted. Roughly one million individuals apply for asylum each
year. For purposes of this paper, asylum seekers are applying for asylum, protection, and
integration in the immediate country they fled to. Refugees are in second countries, applying to
be refugees to a third country, since the immediate second country they fled to is not allowing
them to be fully integrated or get asylum. Once an asylum seeker is granted asylum, they are
known as an asylee. Asylees have obtained refugee status in their first country of asylum and
possess the same rights as resettled refugees; for that reason, this thesis will use the term refugee
to encompass both asylees and resettled refugees frequently.
Finally, this paper must distinguish between refugees and international migrants.
Migrants encompass the entire spectrum of individuals who leave their home countries to seek a

UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.”
“Asylum-Seekers.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, n.d. https://www.unhcr.org/enus/asylum-seekers.html.
3
4
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life elsewhere. Refugees fit within this category, but migrants can also leave home for economic
reasons or a bevy of other purposes (e.g. to study, to travel/visit, to work). Economic migrants
are not eligible for asylum because a lack of money or a search for superior living conditions are
not within the definition of “refuge”. Many people fear migrants entering their country because
they believe that they are coming to take jobs or simply improve their lives, but refugees have
been granted internationally protected status and are fleeing persecution. It is important to keep
in mind the distinction between refugees, asylum seekers, and economic migrants over the
course of this thesis.
For refugees, the UNHCR has defined three durable solutions in order to allow refugees
to rebuild their lives after fleeing persecution. These solutions are intended to provide refugees
with the fullest extent of their human rights and grant them opportunities to return to relative
stability. The three durable solutions for refugees are voluntary repatriation, local integration, and
resettlement. Voluntary repatriation occurs when refugees willingly return to their countries of
origin after being granted asylum elsewhere; this can take place after the reason for their initial
persecution has lessened or has ceased to exist in their country of origin altogether; with the
cessation of conflict, a cessation of refugee status may occur as refugees are allowed to return to
their homeland.5 Local integration occurs when a protracted conflict or persecutory state persists
in a refugee’s home country and they are unable to return. In this case, refugee programs exist for
refugees to integrate in their new homes and become part of a new community. Lastly, refugee
resettlement “is the transfer of refugees from a temporary asylum country to another State that
has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent settlement… Resettlement is

“Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection.” United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, 1996. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/3bfe68d32/handbook-voluntary-repatriationinternational-protection.html.
5
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unique in that it is the only durable solution that involves the relocation of refugees from a
temporary asylum country to a third country.”6
Ideally, refugees would not have to exist because there wouldn’t be factors that cause
people to have to flee their homes on the account of persecution based on race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Granting that people
face persecution in their home countries, the best case scenario would be for the source of
persecution, or root cause, to disappear as soon as possible so that refugees may return home
safely. However, the situations that cause asylum seekers to leave home are rarely resolved so
easily. In those cases, local integration and refugee resettlement are the next logical durable
solutions to institute. This paper specifically deals with providing better policies for resettled
refugees and identifying ways for them to acclimate to their new lives.
Furthermore, it is vital to address the misconception that resettling refugees or providing
policies and programs for them is necessarily a political issue. Economic migration may be
political and hotly debated, but refugees have been recognized as protected individuals under the
1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol. All countries that have ratified these
international pieces of legislation agree with the principle of non-refoulement, which means that
“a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or
freedom.”7 In case the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol seem dated or that
the perception on refugees have changed, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously
adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016. This Declaration
“reaffirms the importance of the international refugee regime and contains a wide range of

“Resettlement.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, n.d. https://www.unhcr.org/enus/resettlement.html.
7
UN General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.”
6
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commitments by Member States to strengthen and enhance mechanisms to protect people on the
move.”8 All 193 member states of the United Nations have signed this declaration. It led to the
2018 Global Compact on Refugees, which aims to “ease pressure on hosting countries, enhance
refugee self-reliance, expand access to third-country solutions, and support conditions in
countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.”9
Theorists such as Alexander Betts and Paul Collier have further argued in Refuge:
Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World that humans possess the duty of rescue towards
those in imminent danger and that saving a drowning child crying for help is ethically analogous
to helping Syrians forced to flee their homes. This viewpoint received great acclaim in the
authors’ 2017 publication as establishing a moral and philosophical basis for accepting refugees.
Therefore, it is clear to see that the concept of refugee protection is widely regarded as an
international humanitarian imperative. It is necessary to remove to stigma of politics from this
field of policy. This thesis does not seek to make bold claims such as open door policies to host
refugees, but rather to ensure that realistic measures are taken to ensure that refugees have the
opportunity to be self-reliant in their new homes and that they are afforded the full rights
guaranteed to them by the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol. The specific
rights guaranteed by those legal documents to be discussed in the following pages are the right to
be free from discrimination (Article 3), the right to freedom of religion (Article 4), to right to
self-employment (Article 17) and wage-earning employment (Article 18), the right to
elementary education and education higher than elementary (Article 22), the right to free

8
“New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
n,d. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/new-york-declaration-for-refugees-and-migrants.html.
9
“The Global Compact on Refugees.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, n.d.
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/the-global-compact-on-refugees.html.
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movement within the country (Article 26), the right to non-refoulement (Article 33), and the
right to seek assimilation and naturalization (Article 34) in the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Now that the purpose and scope of the paper have been clarified, it is prudent to examine
some background statistical information upon which the policy recommendations of this thesis
will be based.

Total
2018
Hosting

Intake in
2018

Hosting Plan in Place?

USA

313,241

22,491
(cap:
45,000)

Resettlement federal (ORR), but programs for assistance vary
state-to-state

Canada

114,109

28,000
(cap:
28,000)

Government-assisted refugee programs, private sponsor
programs, private sponsorship, clear path to permanent residency

Germany 1,063,837 4,600
(cap:
4,600)

Work and residency visas, strong educational programs, political
issues in integration, difficult but possible citizenship

Italy

189,243

695**
(cap:1000
for
2018/19)

New 2 year integration plan, but undeveloped framework

Hungary

6,040

0

Anti-immigration campaigns, border hunters, closure of camps
and programs, but still minimal support

Uganda

1,165,653 5,478*

Based around education and land cultivation for subsistence, not
integration necessarily

Kenya

421,248

Reliance on UNHCR and NGOs for program development,
camp-focused hosting

4,540*

*Total figure likely much higher
** As of July 31, 2019

All of the data in this chart comes from 2018 World Bank, the UNHCR, and officially
published statistical data from the national governments of these countries, which represents the
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most complete and recent data set as of the completion of this thesis.1011 It shows the total
number of refugees, total newly resettled refugees, and a brief summary of the hosting plan for
each of our countries of focus in 2018. It also shows the 2018 annual refugee caps of the
countries that set them and whether those countries reached their caps.
For the resettled refugee totals of Kenya and Uganda, the numbers possess an asterisk
next to them to denote that the number of new refugees in these countries is likely much higher
due to their status as Haven countries. Refugee resettlement typically indicates refugees moving
to a third country, but both Kenya and Uganda are so close to zones of conflict that many
asylum-seekers come to the countries directly to seek refugee status. Those figures are not
indicated by the UNHCR’s refugee resettlement numbers. Therefore, the Haven countries total
intake of refugees is likely much higher than the reported figures above.
The above chart will support proposals offered later in this thesis and lead to some
interesting conclusions that highlight how differently each of our 7 countries of focus could
approach refugee law and policy.

Freedom from
discrimination
(Articles 3, 4,
and 33)

Right to
education
(Article 22)

Freedom
of
movement
(Article
26)

Right to
naturalization
and
citizenship
(Article 34)

Right to
Benefits for
work and/or refugees
vocational
training
(Articles 17
and 18)

USA
Canada
Germany

10
“Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum.” The World Bank, 2019.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sm.pop.refg?most_recent_value_desc=true.
11
“UNHCR Population Statistics.” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020.
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/resettlement.
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Italy
Hungary
Uganda
Kenya
Green: The country provides this right/service
Yellow: The country somewhat provides this right/service
Red: The country does not provide this right/service
The second chart of this thesis is represented quite differently and constitutes a large
proportion of the coming argument. As mentioned, this paper plans to evaluate the rights
guaranteed to refugees based on the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol to
ensure that countries are providing for the self-sufficiency of refugees and affording them the
rights guaranteed to them in those multilateral United Nations treaties. The primary points of
contention in this thesis are those represented by the Yellow and Red blocks of the above chart.
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Haven Countries

The first policy areas to explore are Uganda and Kenya, the two haven countries
represented in this thesis. Havens are defined by Betts and Collier as states that are not
necessarily close to each other, but “they are all close to fragile states.”12 Primarily located in
Africa and the Middle East, these countries are the first options for refugees fleeing their
homelands to seek a new haven. Developing countries host 90% of the world’s refugees and
haven nations in particular serve as the front line for both incoming asylum seekers and resettled
refugees. Unfortunately, “for every $135 of public money spent on an asylum-seeker in Europe,
just $1 is spent on a refugee in the developing world.” Shortages in funding and massive asylum
seeker influxes present novel challenges for countries such as Uganda and Kenya, which host
many of the world’s South Sudanese and Somali refugees. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of
refugee camps as a method of hosting present issues for refugee freedom of movement,
education quality, and employment opportunities.
There are a number of reasons that haven countries might choose to provide refuge for
asylum seekers and resettled refugees outside of humanitarian imperatives. Hosting refugees and
asylees can not only serve to provide havens with a monetary boost through the economic
participation of refugees, but it can also bring in much needed foreign aid to low and middle
income countries. According to 2017 report by Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, some may perceive refugees to be a net cost on economic and social development
in the host country, but refugees can stimulate consumption, “create employment opportunities,
and attract aid and humanitarian investments in, for example, infrastructure, which would benefit

12

Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World (Oxford
University Press, 2017), 3.
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refugees as well as the society as a whole.”13 Refugee hosting programs in the developing world
are fueled by private sector, NGO, and governmental assistance. For example, outside of general
development aid, the World Bank declared in 2019 that it would contribute an additional $2.2
billion for refugees and host communities and an additional $4.7 billion for countries affected by
fragility, conflict, and violence as part of its financing of the International Development
Association.14 These funds can obviously provide much better living circumstances for refugees,
but they can also strengthen the economic and social institutions of haven countries to better
provide for their own citizens as well. With this in mind, this also carries a greater risk of
corruption if resources are siphoned into areas other than what was originally intended.

David Khoudour and Lisa Andersson, “Assessing the Contribution of Refugees to the Development of
Their Host Countries,” The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, September 28, 2017,
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DEV/DOC(2017)1&docLanguage=En.
14
“World Bank Announces $2.2 Billion Scale-up in Support for Refugees and Host Communities at First
Global Refugee Forum,” World Bank, December 17, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2019/12/17/world-bank-announces-us22-billion-scale-up-in-support-for-refugees-and-host-communities-atfirst-global-refugee-forum.
13
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Uganda.
Uganda undoubtedly fits the definition of a haven country. Situated between the
destabilized nations of South Sudan and the DRC, Uganda has served as a country of first
asylum for hundreds of thousands of refugees in the last few years. According to the UNHCR,
62.2% of Uganda’s nearly 1.4 million refugees come from South Sudan, while 28.9% come from
the DRC.15 Additionally, a small number of refugees continue to enter the country via refugee
resettlement each year (5,000-10,000, according to UNHCR statistics). To this day, Uganda
remains an attractive option for those fleeing persecution due to its comprehensive refugee
program, which is shown by the nation hosting more refugees than any other country on the
African continent.16
However, this wasn’t always the case. Uganda’s history of refugee hosting remains
problematic due to its lack of acceptance for refugees of all races and ethnicities in the past. In
fact, Uganda didn’t sign the 1951 Refugee Convention until 1976, despite hosting many refugees
before that time. Uganda enacted the 1955 Control of Refugees from the Sudan Ordinance to
cope with refugees escaping South Sudan before the country gained its independence.17 In 1960,
Uganda signed the Control of Alien Refugees Act (CARA) to give authorities widespread control
of refugee populations after Rwandan refugees began to enter the country in wake of the fall of
the Rwandan Monarchy. While these pieces of legislation may seem progressive, Uganda

“Country – Uganda,” Uganda Refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, March 31,
2020), https://ugandarefugees.org/en/country/uga.
16
“The World's Refugees in Numbers,” Amnesty International, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/whatwe-do/refugees-asylum-seekers-and-migrants/global-refugee-crisis-statistics-and-facts/.
17
Lucy Hovil, “Uganda’s Refugee Policies: The History, the Politics, the Way Forward” (International
Refugee Rights Initiative, October 2018), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRRI-Ugandapolicy-paper-October-2018-Paper.pdf, 4.
15
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focused on “control rather than protection” during this time and aimed to “neutralize the political
intentions” of incoming refugees.18
Uganda’s acceptance of refugees took a callous turn in the early 1970s. In the year 1972,
Ugandan President Idi Amin announced that “all Asians had 90 days to leave the country.”19 A
subsequent exodus of 80,000 Asians from Uganda occurred, creating refugees that fled primarily
to the United Kingdom. They received only $55 each from the Ugandan government to start their
new lives.20 After Idi Amin’s removal from his post, approximately 200,000 Ugandan refugees
continued to flee fled the country in the mid-1980s to South Sudan due to “association with the
prior regime.”21 Most of them managed to return to Uganda in the late 1980s.
Uganda ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1976, but still relied on refugee camps
for hosting and placed heavy restrictions on freedom of movement for refugees within the
country. In 1987, Uganda also ratified the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Refugee
Convention, which strengthened and modified refugee classification. The OAU Convention
expanded the definition of a refugee from someone with a well-founded fear of persecution
based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion
to include “every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or
events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.”22 It also expanded rights to asylum

Hovil, “Uganda’s Refugee Policies”, 4.
Reem Shaddad, “Uganda's Asian Exodus: Rose-Tinted Memories and Current Realities,” Al Jazeera (Al
Jazeera Media Network, June 19, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/uganda-asian-exodus-rosetinted-memories-current-realities-180528065513973.html.
20
Ibid.
21
Hovil, "Uganda’s Refugee Policies”, 4.
22
Marina Sharpe, “African Union Refugee Definition,” Rights in Exile Programme (AMERA International,
n.d.), http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/african-union-refugee-definition.
18
19
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and non-refoulement, while establishing a basic system for refugee responsibility-sharing within
Africa.
Each of Uganda’s actions seemed to strengthen its refugee program, but the country
continued to play a role in the destabilization of African governments into the late 1900s. The
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was formed in Uganda and contributed to the 1990 Rwandan
Civil War as well as the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.23 That conflict led 202,000 Rwandan refugees
to flee to Uganda. From 1986 to 2006, Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rose up to
combat the Ugandan Government’s oppression of northern Ugandans; in response, the Ugandan
government required the people of northern Ugandans to leave their villages24, leading to a
massive rise of internally displaced Ugandans in their own country.25
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Uganda’s own struggle with internal
displacement and persecution has led the country’s citizens to be more welcoming and
understanding of refugee populations seeking haven within Uganda into the 2000s. In 1999,
Uganda, along with the UNHCR, began to implement a Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) for
refugees.26 Uganda’s government stated that, “the policy’s core idea was to transform refugees
from being a ‘burden’ or mere ‘beneficiaries’ of humanitarian aid, into agents of development.”27
But Ugandans largely considered the SRS a failure, as local Ugandans derived little benefit from
continued refugee-camp-based hosting, regardless of their own financial contributions to help
refugees.

Hovil, "Uganda’s Refugee Policies", 5.
“History of the War,” Invisible Children , n.d., https://invisiblechildren.com/challenge/history/.
25
Hovil, "Uganda’s Refugee Policies", 5.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
23
24
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Consequently, Uganda developed the Development Assistance for Refugee-Hosting
Areas (DAR) policy in 2003 and created a new national Refugee Act in 2006 along with Refugee
Regulations in 2010. These acts allowed refugee populations to expand beyond large camps and
officially granted them status and rights according to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969
OAU Convention. At last, refugees were granted the right to freedom of movement and the right
to work within Uganda. However, many still considered DAR to be a failure because the
implementation of recent policies occurred in a manner that was both uneven and inefficient;
“For instance, it brought revenue into certain areas over which local leaders had some control,
and additional spending power of international staff which boosted local economies.”28 Still,
DAR opened Uganda up to international refugee aid, granting the country international status as
a champion of human rights and attracting attention from investors.
After signing the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016, Uganda
further strengthened its refugee programs with the Comprehensive Refugee Response
Framework (CRRF) in 2017, working closely with the United Nations. This progressive
development of the Ugandan refugee program relied upon 5 pillars: Admission and rights,
Emergency response and ongoing needs, Resilience and self-reliance, Expanded solutions, and
Voluntary repatriation.29 The CRRF relies on “the government’s Refugee and Host Population
Empowerment Strategy (ReHoPE) – a “transformative strategy” that is meant to “bring together
a wide range of stakeholders in a harmonised and cohesive manner to ensure more effective
programming.”30 The overlapping policy frameworks of Uganda have allowed them to create
communities like the Bidibidi refugee camp in the north of the country, which has developed a
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small-scale economy in under one year and experiences a high amount of interaction with local
Ugandans.31 For example, locals are able to use the camp’s health facilities, send their kids to
school with Bidibidi, and purchase items from the local vendors within the camp, according to
Public Radio International.
To this day, the majority of refugees within Uganda come from South Sudan and the
DRC. The origin of Uganda’s refugees has significant implications for the location of refugees
within the country. Most of the settlements and communities for refugees from South Sudan are
located in the North of Uganda, near the South Sudanese border, while most of the settlements
for refugees from the DRC are located in Western Uganda, near the DRC’s border. However,
refugees in Uganda still retain the right to free movement within the country, so they can travel
to other communities if they so choose.
In the last 50 years, Uganda has slowly shifted from its reliance on emergency aid to
refugees in camps to establishing long-lasting solutions for communities of refugees within given
districts of the country, allowing refugee populations to participate in the national economy and
interact with local Ugandan populations. Notable districts include Yumba, Adjumani, Arua, and
Obongi in the North, along with Kyegegwa in the East and Isingoro in the South.32 This model of
hosting provides numerous positive factors for refugee livelihoods and it leads to governmental,
NGO, and private sector aid being concentrated in the aforementioned districts of Uganda.
Despite the poverty present in northern Uganda, the high quantity of international aid entering
those areas has the possibility of providing prosperity for both refugees and local Ugandans.
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The following map by the UNHCR shows the concentration of refugee and asylumseeker populations in Uganda as of November 2019:
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Figure 1. This image comes from a UNHCR infographic regarding the population and distribution of
refugees, asylees, and asylum seekers in Uganda as of November 2019. Image from
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/72790.
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Uganda’s refugee program currently obeys the guidelines of the 1951 Refugee
Convention as well as the 1967 OAU Convention. Uganda accepts all asylum seekers regardless
of nationality or ethnicity, it grants refugees the right to seek employment and the right to
freedom of movement, and it provides “prima facie” asylum for refugees of certain nationalities,
meaning that for neighboring areas of conflict like South Sudan and the DRC, the bar has been
lowered to acquire refugee status in Uganda.34 Uganda’s refugee hosting model also contains a
number of unique features that differentiates Uganda from its other African counterparts. Most
notably, Uganda grants a portion of land to incoming refugee families, which they use for
agricultural growth and the construction of local businesses.35 In Kampala, 21% of refugee
businesses owners “said they hire people that are not family members and 40% of those
employees are Ugandan nationals.”36
According to the U.S. agency for international development, “the marginal benefit of
providing land to refugee households results in an additional annual contribution to the local
economy of up to $205” per household each year.37 According to the Refugee Law Project at
Makerere University in 2016, basic educational services and vocational training for refugees
seem “satisfactory and well-attended.”38 World Bank reports indicate that, “refugees located in
rural settlements, whether on community-owned or gazetted lands, are able to access basic
services, receive physical protection, and cultivate land provided to them for self-sustenance.”
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This land belongs to the Ugandan government and consists largely of reclaimed land from
former Rwandan refugees who have returned home.39 According to Uganda, all refugees who
want land are eligible to receive it. Refugees with some income or ability to fend for themselves
are self-settled in urban centers.”40 Over 78% of refugees in rural settlements are engaged in
agricultural activities, while 43% of refugees in Uganda hold positions of formal employment.41
Furthermore, almost 100% of refugees surveyed by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) in
Uganda stated that they receive food aid, while 83% of refugees surveyed have reported that they
are not struggling to get by.42 All of these policies are dedicated to creating self-sufficiency for
refugees in Uganda and so far, the Ugandan refugee program appears to be succeeding in
providing some semblance of normalcy for refugees to either integrate into their host
communities or to survive long enough to return home.
In the year 2016, Uganda received $1.6 billion in international development aid to
support its programs. Uganda’s total government expenditure in that year was $11.1 billion,
though it is unclear how much of that funding went directly to refugees.43 Some of the estimated
costs to run Uganda’s refugee program include $146 million for energy and water, $91 million
for ecosystem loss, $30 million for provision of land, $156 million for international humanitarian
aid, and $1 billion in remittances to refugees, according to data from UN OCHA FTS, OECD
DAC, World Bank remittance data, IMF World Economic Outlook and UNDP.44 Although the
amount of aid going into Uganda’s refugee program is significant, it appears that the Ugandan
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government still needs to fund the majority of its own refugee policies. According to Deutsche
Welle, Uganda hopes for an economic boost from refugee participation, but only receives one
quarter of the development aid they seek to fully fund their refugee program.45
Surveys of Ugandan locals’ public perception of refugees also indicate that populations
fleeing persecution into Uganda are largely welcomed in the country. According to the
International Rescue Committee in a 2018 study, 33% of Ugandans have interacted with
refugees, 89% of Ugandans believe that Uganda has been a good example of refugee hosting,
81% believe that the government has hosted refugees “well or very well”, 95% support
government assistance for refugees, 86% advocate for refugees to be accepted in public schools,
84% support the self-sufficiency of refugees in Uganda, and 60% favor refugee integration into
local communities.46 From this data, it is clear that Ugandans support their governments actions
in providing new and comprehensive hosting methods for refugees, but there are some responses
within the survey that appear less favorable. Only 44% of Ugandans support refugees gaining
citizenship in the country, 27% of Ugandans see refugees as a burden or a threat, and Ugandans
appear generally skeptical towards the idea of full refugee integration.47 Nonetheless, Ugandan
support for hosting vulnerable communities has played a large part in developing the country’s
programs for aid.
On the other hand, a number of economic and infrastructural challenges continue to beset
hosting in Uganda. Refugees remain primarily in designated settlements and refugees who
choose to move to urban communities “continue to be largely excluded from any support beyond
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a legal status and sometimes cannot access even that.”48 In theory, all refugees are afforded full
legal status and economic benefits in Uganda, but many who leave their settlements forfeit their
economic benefits in practice. In northern Uganda, rates of poverty remain high and access to
clean water and arable land remains low for agricultural communities.49 In impoverished
settlements like Palorinya, “The settlement’s three sprawling zones are situated more than 20
kilometers away from markets, vocational training centers, and hospitals; poor-quality roads
make the journey all the more arduous to complete.”50 With the arrival of hundreds of thousands
of refugees in the last few years, Uganda’s services are struggling to keep up with the massive
refugee influx to the country. Even items of aid such as seeds from the World Food Bank have
undercut local prices and hurt local economies, while simultaneously discouraging investors.
Furthermore, refugees still rely upon savings from their past lives in their home countries,
often being forced to sell off goods to maintain their well-being. Pilot programs for cash transfer
in Uganda have alleviated this burden somewhat, but truly large-scale cash transfer to refugees
remains difficult to implement due to a lack of trust from international communities for
unconditional or multipurpose cash transfers.51 Public unrest has continued to build as the
Ugandan government has begun to cut back on land grants for incoming refugees, recognizing
that they need to clear new land or encroach upon existing communities to accommodate new
arrivals.52 Even statistical data to determine where and for what purposes refugee assistance is
being provided remains difficult to track. Even for the Ugandan government, interpreting budget
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information, “and following the execution of the budget through ministries and departments and
across national and district-level budgets” has been difficult.53
Finally, Uganda’s own internal struggles have hindered its own refugee programs and its
international support. In February 2018, an audit of Uganda’s refugee program revealed that
refugee numbers in Uganda had been over-reported and that “funds raised during the 2017
Solidarity Summit were unaccounted for.”54 The backlash from this event led to a number of
sponsors pulling support from the Ugandan refugee program and an international reduction of
trust in Uganda’s transparency. Meanwhile, European investors have been more concerned with
refugee hosting in their own continent and have directed the majority of their funding to
European interests instead of helping the millions of refugees situated in Africa. To this day,
there is no agreed upon method under Uganda’s CRRF system to track resource contributions for
maximum transparency and this is a damning point for investors who are considering providing
humanitarian aid.55 Furthermore, the Ugandan Constitutional Court ruled on October 6, 2015,
that refugees are eligible to apply for citizenship in Uganda through either registration or
naturalization (which requires living in Uganda for 20 years), but most refugees who have
applied for citizenship since then have yet to be granted a ruling on their citizenship status.56
To summarize, here is a timeline of Uganda’s relevant ratified refugee legislation for their
refugee program:
Legislation Year
Implemented
1955

Legislation Name

Description of Legislation

Control of Refugees from the
Sudan Ordinance

Established a basic refugee program,
with numerous restrictions on refugees
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Control of Alien Refugees Act
(CARA)
Ratification of the 1951
Refugee Convention and 1967
Refugee Protocol
Ratification of the 1969 OAU
Convention on Refugees

1976

1989

1999

Implementation of the SelfReliance Strategy (SRS)

2003

Implementation of the
Development Assistance for
Refugee-Hosting Areas (DAR)
policy
Passage of the Refugee Act

2006

2010

Institution of the Refugee
Regulation from the Refugee
Act
Implementation of the
Comprehensive Refugee
Response Framework (CRRF)

2017

Rook 28
Granted control of refugees to local
authorities
Established the basic definition of a
refugee, along with refugee human
rights
Expanded the definition of a refugee and
provided greater leniency for asylumseekers
Attempted to “integrate services
provided to refugees into existing public
service structures and make refugee
settlements self-reliant by allocating
land to refugees and allowing them free
access to government health and
education services”57
Modified the SRS to improve impacts
on host communities

Created new administrative structures
and reinforced refugee citizenship and
employment
Put the Refugee Act into practice

Expanded the Ugandan refugee
program, adding more international
stakeholders and focusing on refugee
self-reliance.

After reviewing the history and scale of Uganda’s refugee program, the country appears
to be largely in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention. In theory, refugees in Uganda
today do not experience discrimination, possess the freedom to travel the country or leave
settlements, have access to education, vocational training, and employment opportunities, receive
benefits and services from the Ugandan government in the way of land, health services, and
emergency assistance, and they are afforded the right to become Ugandan citizens after 20 years
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of residence. In practice, refugees might lose access to services if they leave their initial
settlements and may undergo difficulties in receiving Ugandan citizenship. Nevertheless, the
World Bank regards Uganda’s refugee program as one of the most progressive in the world.58
Hence this practice may be in violation of the UN Refugee Convention Articles 26 and 34,
regarding the rights to freedom of movement and naturalization.
On the basis of this thesis’ analysis of Uganda’s strengths and weaknesses in refugee
hosting, this thesis offers the following policy recommendations:
First, Uganda should develop comprehensive vocational training programs for refugees
working outside of agricultural communities. 72% of Ugandan refugees are unemployed and
many of them lack the necessary skills training to become an active part of the Ugandan
workforce and contribute to the economy.59
Second, Uganda must invest in improving access to basic services in refugee settlements.
Improving road construction and access to clean water not only enables refugees to be more selfreliant, but also improves access to basic services for native Ugandans. Currently, investment in
infrastructure in Uganda is under-developed and under-funded.60
Third, the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) must work in conjunction with
international actors to produce more detailed and complete records for resource tracking of the
Ugandan refugee program. When resource tracking is left incomplete, funds for programs can go
missing and lead to corruption scandals, like the fallout of Uganda’s 2017 fund allocation audit.
Major gaps exist in tracking of new refugee arrivals as well as refugee program resources and to
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allocate program funds accurately, the Ugandan refugee program must account for new
populations.61 Utilizing accountability-based organizations like the UNHCR to verify resource
tracking can bolster the trust of international actors to donate more funds to Uganda’s refugee
program. In addition, funders should also establish policies and procedures to hold grantee states
accountable, and provide training on their accounting methods/software to ensure that the funds
are reaching refugee programs.
Fourth, local communities must be more closely involved in refugee program decisions.
Many Ugandans themselves are challenged by poverty and lack of access to services, especially
in Northern Uganda; they would be more likely to accommodate refugees if they felt their
concerns were heard and that they could benefit from the economic success of refugees.62 If local
communities viewed refugees more positively, they would be more likely to welcome them as
their own. Establishing forums for community leaders, refugees, and international actors to can
clear up communication issues and make all parties feel heard so that more holistic solutions can
be made.63
Lastly, the African Union must collaborate with Uganda to develop a more cohesive
policy for refugee resettlement. Uganda has more refugees than any other African country and
needs support from surrounding stable nations to shoulder some of the responsibility of hosting.
Taking on refugees is admirable, but it’s for naught if Uganda does not possess the resources to
provide for their self-sufficiency.
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Kenya.
Kenya also serves as a major haven country within Africa. As of December 31, 2019,
Kenya hosts 489,747 refugees, according to UNHCR statistics. It is also the country of first
asylum for most of its refugees, as 54.5% of Kenya’s refugee population comes from Somalia
and 24.4% from South Sudan, two destabilized nations neighboring Kenya. Similarly to Uganda,
Kenya also takes on an additional few thousand resettled refugees each year. However, Kenya’s
refugee policy appears generally less progressive than that of Uganda, as “conditions in the
refugee camps are far from ideal with overcrowding common and a strict encampment policy. In
most cases displacement is protracted and refugees remain in the camps for years without
freedom of movement and without the opportunity to access higher education, employment or to
start businesses.”64
Kenya’s history of refugee hosting began in the 1960s. With a small refugee population
of a few thousand, no specific refugee laws had been enacted within the country, but “refugees
could access work and move freely” under only the purview of the Kenyan government.65 At
last, Kenya signed the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1966 and the 1967 Refugee Protocol in
1981. Despite signing these international pieces of legislation, Kenya made no effort to develop a
refugee program at that time. In the 1970s, the country received an influx of Ugandan refugees
after the administration of Idi Amin, but even then “they were received well and most of them
eventually integrated into Kenyan society” receiving educations and being “allowed to work in
formal sectors.”66
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In the 90s, Kenya’s relatively laissez faire approach to refugee hosting underwent a
dramatic transformation. Hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived from Somalia, Ethiopia,
Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC fleeing civil war, multiplying Uganda’s refugee population
about tenfold.67 In response, the Kenyan government recused itself from refugee hosting, relying
instead on UNCHR emergency response construction of refugee camps. The hope of both the
Kenyan government and the UNHCR was that these refugees could voluntary repatriate after the
cessation of their respective conflicts, making the camps a temporary structure.68 Neither party
had anticipated that additional conflicts would rise up in neighboring countries and make
Kenya’s refugee camps a permanent feature of the country. Many refugees were eventually
repatriated, at times voluntarily and at times involuntarily, but the camps continued to grow in
size due to a continued flow of arrivals.69
Violence in western, northern, and eastern Kenya also sprung up in the 1990s, leaving the
country to contend with the internal displacement of 400,000 Kenyan nationals within the
country.70 Kenya suddenly had to deal with the internal displacement of its own people and the
institution of a refugee program became an afterthought. In fact, Kenya did its utmost to separate
refugee populations from native Kenyan population and refugees became a common scapegoat
for the dramatic increase of violent crime in Kenya in the 1990s.71 The country still refrained
from instituting any formal programs for refugees, despite signing the 1969 OAU Convention in
1993.
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Kenya finally formulated its own Refugee Act in 2006, establishing its own Refugee
Regulations in 2009 to create a national legal framework for refugee hosting and rights. Until
this point, refugees in camps possessed little to no rights within Kakuma and Dabaab, the only
two refugee camps within the country at that point. The 2006 Refugee Act created certain rights
and benefits for refugees within Kenya, including agreements to international OAU and UNHCR
definitions of refugees and the establishment of the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA), the
Refugee Affairs Committee, and the Refugee Affairs Board of Kenya.72
However, Kenya’s 2006 Refugee Act created numerous problems for refugees who
thought they were promised the full extent of their rights by the act. It only allowed refugees the
same rights to work as other “non-nationals” within the country, meaning that they had to apply
for conditional “Class-M” work permits accompanied by “a recommendation from a prospective
employer, and must be accompanied by a letter from the DRA confirming refugee status” to gain
legal employment.73 To further complicate matters, refugees were only allowed to seek work
permits from the government in Nairobi, not in refugee camps, and “refugees were required to
reside in refugee camps unless they had authorization to live elsewhere.”74 Seeking a work
permit was not considered a sufficient reason to leave a refugee camp, so in practice, it was
physically impossible for a refugee in Kenya to legally seek formal employment. Refugees could
not exit their camps without a “movement pass”, the infringement of which entails a “penalty of
a six-month jail term, a fine of 20,000 Kenyan shillings (approximately $200), or both.”75
In 2010, Kenya created a new national constitution. The 2010 Kenyan Constitution
decentralized power within the country for most matters, but kept the administration of services
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for refugees to the national government.76 It also redefined how refugees might gain citizenship
setting requirements that a person must have been a lawful resident for at least 7 years, speaks
Kiswahili or another local language, and makes a substantive contribution to Kenya’s
development. Refugees rarely meet these requirements and the Kenyan government does not
provide naturalization for refugees in practice. To become a lawful permanent resident, refugees
must have lived in Kenya for three years and held a work permit for seven years, but attainment
of a work permit is a difficult process in Kenya, as will be discussed later in this section.77
Kenya’s refugee policy experienced another significant shift during 2011, when over
113,500 Somali refugees fled to the Dabaab refugee camp within an 8 month period, stretching
an already thin set of aid resources even thinner.78 Simultaneously, a series of jihadist group AlShabaab militants arrived in Kenya in 2012, kidnapping humanitarian workers and attacking
native Kenyans.79 Anti-refugee sentiment continued to increase until the Kenyan government
ordered all refugees living outside of Dabaaab and Kakuma to relocate to those camps and
settlements in December of 2012. The Kenyan High Court reversed this decision in July of 2013,
but the Department of Refugee Affairs continued to defy the court’s ruling.80 Violence in Kenya
from militant and terrorist forces continued in the next few years, while the government
responded with mass arrest, detainment, and deportation of “irregular” migrants, while the
UNHCR was unable to access the government’s detainment data.81 Matters continued to escalate
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as the Kenyan government issued a second directive for refugees to move to camps (while over
100,000 refugees continued to live in Nairobi and other urban settlements) and amended the
2006 Refugee Act in December of 2014 to make the national encampment policy permanent.82
The amendments to the refugee act also placed a limit of 150,000 asylum seekers and refugees
permitted to stay in Kenya, when approximately 550,000 resided in the country at the time. Once
again, the Kenyan High Court ruled these amendments “unconstitutional” as they would violate
the principle of non-refoulement.83
Frustrated by constant rejection from the High Court and further incensed by continued
attacks by Al-Shabaab, the Kenyan government resorted to even more drastic measures of
refugee removal. In May 2016, the DRA ordered the closure of the Dabaab refugee camp “within
the shortest possible period.”84 The closure of the Dabaab camp would have meant the forceful
displacement of over 250,000 refugees from the area. Nevertheless, the Kenyan High Court ruled
this directive unconstitutional as an act of “group persecution” and a violation of regional,
national, and international laws.85 In response, the Kenyan government has implemented the
most aggressive program of voluntary repatriation of Somalis that it could legally create, as it
raised $105 million during a Pledging Conference for refugees in Brussels86 to give cash
incentives for Somalis to return home and “66,000 Somali refugees returned between 2015 and
the first half of 2017 under a voluntary repatriation agreement signed between the governments
of Kenya and Somalia and UNHCR in 2013.”87
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In response to the Global Compact on Refugees in 2016, Kenya attempted to sign a new
bill into law in 2017, simply labelled the Refugee Bill. The bill included references to developing
refugee self-reliance within Kenya, but “agreed to remove reference to integration as a possible
durable solution for refugees.”88 While this might have been the start of a more progressive
Kenyan stance on refugees, politics got in the way once again. The Kenyan president vetoed the
Refugee Bill in 2017 and the Kenyan government has just begun to reintroduce it in 2019.
In terms of territory, the concentration of Kenya’s refugees is much easier to define than
that of Uganda as Kenya relies primarily upon a few refugee camps and settlements to host
refugees. Refugee camps and settlements are located in Garissa County, adjacent to Somalia, in
the Southeastern part of the country and Turkana County, which lies next to South Sudan in the
Northeastern part of the country. As of December 31st 2019, Garissa County contains 217, 151
refugees in Dagahala, Ifo, and Hagadera within the Dabaab refugee camp; Turkana County hosts
193, 684 refugees in the Kakuma refugee camp, as well as the recently formed Kalobeyei
refugee settlement. 89 Despite the Kenyan government’s efforts to concentrate refugee
populations within these refugee camps and settlements, 78,912 refugees continue to reside in
the capital city of Nairobi.90 As might be expected, Dabaab contains almost exclusively Somali
refugees, Turkana County contains a majority of South Sudanese refugees, and Nairobi contains
a mix of refugee nationalities.91
In practice, the UNHCR’s emergency response to Kenya’s refugee influx in the 90s has
become a permanent solution for refugees within the country. Refugees retain the rights granted
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to them by the 1951 Refugee Convention in theory, but in practice they rarely have access to
those rights and services. The Kenyan government has tried to forcefully and “voluntarily”
repatriate refugees in the last 25 years, but as more continue to arrive, life in a refugee camp has
become a long-term policy for settlement. The recent rise of the Kalobeyei settlement within
Kenya serves as a prime example of this. In 2013, the UNHCR requested additional land to
expand the Kakuma refugee camp, but this land rapidly developed into a vibrant refugee
settlement of nearly 40,000 people in less than 4 years.92 In 2018, the UNHCR developed the
“Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme (KISEDP), a multiagency collaboration to develop the local economy and service delivery at Kalobeyei” with the
governor of Turkana county to better integrate refugees into the economic life of Kenya.93
The following map by the UNHCR shows the concentration of refugee populations in
Kenya as of December 2019:
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Figure 2. This image comes from a UNHCR infographic regarding the population and distribution of
refugees, asylees, and asylum seekers in Kenya as of December 2019. Image from
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Kenya%20Infographics%20-%2031%20December%202019.p
df.

Identifying Better Refugee Policies

Rook 39

Kenya’s current refugee program is in flux and makes it continuously difficult to enact
progressive refugee policies. The terror threat of Al-Shabaab has made the Kenyan government
wary of allowing newcomers into the country and as a result, the government appears to
constantly be at odds with the Kenyan High Court as well as the UNHCR in affording rights,
freedoms, and services to refugees. Passing Kenya’s modified 2017 Refugee Bill would
significantly strengthen the country’s refugee program, but the issue remains too contentious for
any party to make significant headway.
Asylum seekers attempting to enter Kenya have reported harassment at the Kenyan
border and laws restrictions on asylum and freedom of movement mean that asylum seekers in
Kenya often become classified as economic migrants and deported.95 If an asylum seeker or
refugee is found guilty of being an “irregular migrant” under Kenyan law, they are either
deported or made to pay a significant fine or a custodial sentence of up to 3 years.96 Nowadays, it
is increasingly difficult for asylum seekers to gain refugee status in Kenya. The country
recognizes “prima facie” refugees as those coming from South Sudan or South and Central
Somalia, who receive an expedited asylum process. Any other asylum seekers must undergo a
thorough Refugee Status Determination process that lasts from six months to two years.97 This
issue has become further complicated by the DRA’s suspension of registration for refugees in
urban areas in Kenya since 2012.98
As mentioned before, employment and freedom of movement continue to be contentious
rights in Kenya. Refugees in Kenya can engage in self-employment, informal labor, or low-
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paying NGO work, but to receive formal employment within Kenya, they must apply for a work
permit.99100 Work permits are exceedingly difficult to receive because refugees must attain a
“movement pass” in order to leave their refugee camp or settlement after receiving their refugee
identification card upon being granted asylum. While the majority of Congolese and South
Sudanese refugees in Kenya who receive employment do so through UNHCR and NGO
programs, Somali refugees who participate in the economy are more likely to be selfemployed.101 Refugees in Nairobi have a higher chance of participating in the Kenyan economy,
but in leaving refugee camps or settlements, they give up nearly all UNHCR, NGO, or Kenyan
assistance and access to services.102
Within camps and settlements, however, refugees receive benefits in the form of food aid
from NGOs and governments around the world. This food assistance typically comes in the form
of food rations, but the rations provided are routinely considered “inadequate” to appropriately
feed refugee populations.103104 According to the Overseas Development Institute in 2014, “70–
80% of people in both camps [Dabaab and Kakuma] lacked sufficient food assistance to meet
their monthly requirements.”105 Living standards for refugees vary wildly across Kenya, with
refugees in Nairobi generally being better off than refugees in Kakuma due to superior access to
basic services like water and electricity.106 Overall, native Kenyans have reported significantly
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higher standards of living and well-being than refugees within the country, especially those in
camps.
The discrepancy between Kenyan nationals and refugees continues in the field of
education. As of 2003, Kenya guarantees primary education for all children living in the country
in theory. But according to the UNHCR in 2017, “primary school net enrollment rate for
refugees across camp settings in Kenya is roughly 70 percent for refugees, compared to 85
percent for Kenyan nationals, while secondary school net enrollment rate is 6.1 percent for
refugees compared to 47.8 percent for Kenyan nationals.”107 Services exist for primary school
education in Kenyan refugee camps, but refugees must apply for a movement pass to seek a
secondary education elsewhere. This can prove difficult when approval rates for movement
passes remain low and refugees must give up access to basic services provided by refugee camp
administration programs in order to receive it. Furthermore, primary education in Kenyan
refugee camps is taught predominantly in English and Kiswahili, which proves challenging for
incoming South Sudanese and Somali refugees who arrive speaking a myriad of other
languages.108 In Nairobi, however, Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) have arisen to
provide vocational training and educational support for refugees. Refugees living in Nairobi
receive more years of education, more vocational training, and have better language proficiency
in English and Swahili than those in camps.109 Therefore, despite missing out on the NGO-based
services in refugee camps and settlements, refugees in Nairobi appear to perform better due to a
greater access to services and integration to Kenyan society.
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Kenya’s public opinion on refugees differs significantly from that of Uganda. According
to polls from the International Rescue Committee, 48% of Kenyan nationals have heard in 2018
that Kenya is closing camps and sending refugees home, while 40% have heard that refugees are
a security threat; Meanwhile, 90% believe that Kenya has been a good example on how to host
refugees and 74% believe that the government has managed to host refugees well or very well.110
It appears that due to the political situation in Kenya and the terror threat of Al-Shabaab,
Kenyans appear skeptical of the viability of refugee hosting within the country. In a separate
survey, 96% of Kenyan’s believed that the Kenyan government should provide healthcare to
refugees, along with 95% for security and safety and 94% for education, but only 72% believed
that refugees should get the right to work and 35% though that refugees deserve access to land or
citizenship.111 According to these polls of public opinion, Kenyan public opinion appears to align
roughly with contemporary Kenyan refugee policy.
While most of Kenya’s refugee camps abide by the same structures they have since their
creation in 1991-1992, the Kenyan government has attempted a new method with the Kalobeyei
refugee settlement as of 2015. Kalobeyei is an integrated settlement with both refugees and local
Kenyans; the result of this system has been higher economic participation of refugees and better
access to educational and health services.112 The settlement has also developed a new form of
food assistance through a voucher currency called “bamba chakula”, meaning “get your food” in
Swahili slang.113 A voucher system allows refugees to choose from the items they can receive for
food. Kalobeyei also instituted a market-based cash-for-shelter program that allows refugees to
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choose from the housing they are provided rather than pre-determined living conditions.114 Other
programs are rapidly popping up in Kalobeyei, like business incubators and a prospective
university campus, which would massively improve the institutional strength of the settlement.
Kalobeyei remains an experimental settlement for a small proportion of Kenya’s refugees and the
refugees within the camp continue to experience difficulties in freedom of movement and
obtaining legal work, but its recent successes seem to bode well for future Kenyan refugee
integration.
Unfortunately, Kalobeyei’s success story remains a rare bright spot in a highly
problematic model for refugee hosting. According to Victor Nyamori, Amnesty International's
Refugee Coordinator for East Africa, “Kenya is renowned for its eagerness to support, draft and
sign instruments aimed at protecting the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers, but sadly not for
implementing them.”115 Kenya has signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Refugee
Protocol, the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, and created its own Refugee Act in 2006, but has
routinely failed to implement successful refugee policies according to these acts. In fact, Kenya’s
response to the terror threat of Al-Shabaab and its own lack of border security have led to direct
hostility and backlash towards refugee communities. For the remainder of this analysis of
Kenya’s refugee program, it is vital to note that signed international legislation means very little
for Kenyan practices of refugee hosting.
Here is a timeline of Kenya’s relevant ratified refugee legislation for their refugee
program:
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Legislation Name

Description of Legislation

Ratification of the 1951
Refugee Convention
Ratification of the 1967
Refugee Protocol
Ratification of the 1969
OAU Convention on
Refugees
Passage of the Refugee
Act

Established the basic definition of a refugee

Institution of the Refugee
Regulation from the
Refugee Act
Creation of a new
Kenyan Constitution
Attempted Passage of the
Refugee Bill

Removed geographic and temporal
restrictions on refugees
Expanded the definition of a refugee and
provided greater leniency for asylum-seekers
Recognized international refugee definitions,
defined “prima facie” and “statutory”
refugees, established government agencies for
refugees, and granted a “right to work” to
refugees
Put the 2006 Refugee Act into practice

Retained refugee affairs to a national agency
and established guidelines for naturalization
Would have redefined measures for refugee
self-reliance, employment, and land
ownership

Upon a superficial review of Kenya’s signed refugee legislation, the country appears to
guarantee sufficient rights and services to refugees within its country. However, a deeper dive
into the programs, practice, and conflicts of Kenya’s recent history reveals that the country
violates the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 Refugee Protocol, the 1969 OAU Refugee
Convention, and its own 2006 Refugee Act in a multitude of ways. In the 1951 Refugee
Convention alone, the Kenyan government has discriminated against refugees and attempted to
prevent them from entering the country, limited access to wage-earning employment, enacted
barriers to both primary and secondary education, limited citizenship opportunities, severely
restricted free movement of refugees, and attempted to violate non-refoulement by signing
directives to expel refugees from the country. Thereby, Kenya has not complied with Article 3,
Article 18, Article 22, Article 26, Article 33, or Article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention,
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nearly all of the international policy measures to be analyzed within this thesis. Furthermore,
access to international aid and government assistance remains conditional on remaining within
refugee camps and settlements.
On the basis of this analysis, this thesis offers a number of refugee policy
recommendations to drastically reform Kenya’s refugee program. The first of these
recommendations primarily pertains to refugee programs and policy, while the second involves
political will and international cooperation.
In order to fully comply with international guidelines and provide for the self-sufficiency
of refugees, Kenya must enact a new Refugee Bill. Refugee Bills have been proposed several
times in the last few years, but none have been signed into law. However, a comprehensive and
new refugee bill could sufficiently address land rights, education, access to employment, and
overall refugee quality of life. This thesis proposes the following inclusions for a new Kenyan
Refugee Bill:
First, the bill must establish a more lenient basis for granting movement passes to Kenyan
refugees. The right to work is a fundamental part of life, and while it might be too dramatic and
unfeasible to immediately do away with refugee camp hosting in Kenya, allowing them the right
to travel in order to seek work permits will increase refugee employment in country along with
their ability to achieve permanent residency.
Second, the bill must remove the component of making a “substantive contribution to
Kenya’s development” from its naturalization requirements. This term is unnecessarily vague
and can lead to the arbitrary rejection of citizenship for refugees. To become a permanent
resident, refugees must already have held work permits for seven years, so it can be assumed that
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they have already made a substantive contribution to Kenya through over seven years of formal
employment.
Third, the Kenya government must administer services uniformly to refugees across the
country. Suspension of food aid, health services, and government assistance to refugees in
Nairobi does not comply with international guidelines and they must receive equal support as
those living in camps and settlements.
Fourth, the bill must include provisions for improved education to refugees in camps.
Most Somali and South Sudanese refugees do not speak Kiswahili upon entrance to camps and
phasing in Kiswahili Language Learner (KLL) programs will allow refugees to attain a
legitimate chance at Kenyan citizenship. Furthermore, camps should establish access to
secondary education that does not require refugees seeking movement passes and forfeiting
access to aid.
Fifth, the Kenyan government should establish more settlements like Kalobeyei within
the country to allow the economic participation and gender equality of refugees in Kenya.
Including zones similar to special economic zones (SEZs) within the country will lead to the
gradual expansion of economic participation within the country and greater integration of
refugees. Betts and Collier have already recommended similar measures that have paid dividends
for refugees from the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan.116
Sixth, the bill must encourage refugee departments of the Kenyan government to work
more closely with the UNHCR, NGOs, and local refugee networks to develop a more
comprehensive system of data collection for refugees within the country. Establishing accurate
numbers for refugee registration, refugee income and education levels, and identifying the needs
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of Kenya’s refugee population will help to build trust with the international community and assist
all parties to better identify the distribution of Kenyan refugee aid.
Outside of enacting a new refugee bill, the Kenyan government must make a number of
political commitments to refugees all over the country. The government must stop labelling
refugees as members of Al-Shabaab or terror threats to the country. Stigmatizing all refugees as
dangerous and untrustworthy only turns native Kenyans against refugees and increases tensions
within the country. The government must also stop trying to deport refugees from their country
and close camps as this damages international good will towards Kenya and reduces the funding
that international organizations and countries are willing to give them. Changing Kenya’s
political stance will lead to improved public opinion toward refugees, an improved international
perception of Kenya, and more aid for Kenyan refugee programs.
It must be noted that many of these measures are only intermediary steps for making
refugees fully self-sufficient in Kenya. The purpose of this thesis is to give realistic
recommendations for countries to follow international guidelines for refugees, but following the
above recommendations represents an important first step in protecting and supporting the nearly
half a million refugees currently residing in Kenya.
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Europe has played a diverse role in refugee hosting that has changed tremendously over
time. At first, the 1951 Refugee Convention was signed primarily to shelter 60 million displaced
Europeans in the wake of the Second World War.117 At that time, Europe served as both the
predominant refugee producer and refugee host of the world. Since then, no European conflicts
of that scale have taken place again, and while Europe has encountered many national and
international destabilizing conflicts that have produced refugees, European countries have found
themselves needing to host those facing persecution more than they have produced them. With
the advent of the Syrian refugee crisis, Europe suddenly needed to fulfill its international
obligations set 60 years prior to millions of “outsiders.” Although Europe is widely considered
the wealthiest part of the world, the continent was much more hesitant in responding to the
refugee crisis than Haven countries in the immediate proximity of newly destabilized nations.
The crisis led to a broad spectrum of responses from European countries, each of which
held different positive and negative consequences for both refugees and native Europeans. This
section will explore three very different countries in Europe with regard to refugee hosting:
Germany, Italy, and Hungary. Germany became Europe’s prime example of freely accepting both
resettled refugees and asylum seekers through Angela Merkel’s “Wir schaffen das” policy, but
open doors led to their own negative consequences when other countries refused to share the
burden. Italy primarily encountered asylum seekers travelling by boat to Europe, but this reaction
led to overreliance on emergency aid and hosting programs. And Hungary became the classic
example of refusing hosting and closing borders, suddenly fearing the change that incoming
“outsiders” might bring. All of these responses require vastly different policy recommendations.
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Germany.
Germany has become Europe’s primary country for refugee hosting. At the end of 2018,
Germany held 1.06 million refugees, the 6th most of any country in the world and the most of any
European country aside from Turkey.118 It was also the third largest donor to the UNHCR in
2018.119 The majority of refugees in Germany come from Syria, with the 2nd and 3rd most
common countries being Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively.120 Although Germany continues to
resettle a few thousand refugees per year (approximately 4,000-6,000, as part of an EU program),
their primary intake comes via asylum seeker applications within the country, as Germany
receives hundreds of thousands of asylum applications each year, of which 25-50% eventually
receive approval.121
However, Germany’s history of refugees has not always been so magnanimous. In fact,
Germany was once one of the world’s greatest refugee producers. During the Second World War,
over half a million Jewish refugees fled Germany due to imminent persecution and after the war,
“over 12 million Germans were internally displaced.”122 Neither the Nazi regime of the 1930s
and 1940s and the subsequent Soviet regime in East Germany were keen on accepting foreigners
nor were they too concerned with protecting the rights of their citizens. As East German citizens
continued to flee from oppressive circumstances, the Soviet government attempted to shut down
its borders to prevent Germans from fleeing to the West. On the other hand, West Germany
began to accept “guest workers” in order to reduce unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s. The
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first guest workers came from Italy in 1955, but West Germany soon formed contracts with
Greece, Spain, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia as well to supplement
German labor shortages.123 In 1964, “the arrival of the millionth ‘guest worker,’ Rodrigues de Sá
of Portugal, was celebrated.”124
Despite West Germany’s initial openness, the country’s acceptance of foreigners did not
last long. In 1966-1967, an economic crisis put an end to West Germany’s previously consistent
growth and many West Germans placed the blame on newly-arrived foreign workers.125 In 1973,
West Germany enacted an “Anwerbestopp”, or recruitment ban on foreign labor to curb
immigration. They had hoped that guest workers would eventually return to their countries of
origin, but very few acquiesced to voluntary return and many sought permanent residence at their
new homes.126
West Germany may have closed its doors to economic migrants during the recruitment
ban, but maintained its international obligations to accept refugees. Germany signed the 1951
Refugee Convention in 1953 and the 1967 Refugee Protocol in 1969, so the country still had an
obligation to shelter those fleeing from persecution. This first took effect for non-Germans in
1978, when the country accepted 40,000 Vietnamese refugees in the aftermath of the Vietnam
war.127 This was merely the beginning for German refugee hosting, as hundreds of thousands of
asylum seekers from Poland, Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon came to West Germany for refuge in the
early 1980s.128
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After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union in 1989, Germany ceased to be a
producer of refugees entirely. However, more asylum-seekers than ever were entering the
country as “a series of ethnically-based wars broke out in the former Yugoslavia, displacing
millions of people from the Balkans.”129 Reportedly, 80% of the asylum requests in Europe at
that time took place in Germany.130 The newly reunified nation did not respond positively to this
massive influx of refugees and xenophobic attitudes rose as “the admission of refugees was no
longer seen as proof of success in global competition among political systems, but appeared
instead as an additional burden on the welfare state.”131 Right wing radicals began to attack the
homes of refugees and migrants around the country into the early 1990s. The culmination of
Germany’s new wave of anti-refugee sentiment was the “Asylum Compromise”, which decreed
that asylum seekers from countries “free of persecution” or that had passed through “safe” thirdstates on the way to Germany were no longer eligible to apply for asylum. The part of
Germany’s Basic Law that included this amendment was Article 16a. Although this new piece of
legislation seemed reasonable in theory, it essentially meant that Germany could only accept
resettled refugees and not asylum-seekers because all bordering nations to Germany were
considered “safe third-states.”132 The passage of this directive vastly decreased the number of
asylum-seekers entering Germany.
Germany’s prior acceptance of foreigners meant that Germany had a significant refugee
population, but services for integration of refugees within the country were lacking. In fact,
Germany only guaranteed “jus solis”, or naturalization for people born on German soil, in the
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year 2000. Germany’s asylum act was created in 1982 and has been continuously updated from
that point, but had still not established clear measures for residence, integration, languagelearning, or employment in Germany. The country finally signed many of these measures into
law with the passage of the 2005 Immigration Act and the National Integration Plan in 2007. The
new legislation “ has adopted more than 400 measures and voluntary commitments relating to
integration.”133 Modifications to housing programs, permanent residence, and language-training
were made at the same time. The 2012 National Action Plan on Integration clarified “reviewable
target specifications and regular evaluations… to make integration policy in Germany more
binding” in implementing the 2007 Plan.134
These policy adjustments came just in time for Germany’s biggest policy-based challenge
of the 21st century, the Syrian refugee crisis. Hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers came to
Europe, shuffled northward to the German border by countries who would not take them, and
Chancellor Merkel had to make a decision. Despite a previously stern stance on refugee arrivals,
the Chancellor said “Wir schaffen das”, or “we will do it”, and opened the borders to migrants.
Germany had expected other countries to follow suit and share the burden, but very few obliged.
In just a few months, Germany experienced an influx of 300,000 migrants and subsequently
strengthened its border controls.135 Nevertheless, the flow of asylum-seekers northward
continued through the fluid European borders created by the Schengen Area. Eventually, the EU
made a deal with Turkey to limit asylum-seekers travelling through to Europe and take on the

133
The Federal Government of Germany, “The National Integration Plan,” Archiv der Bundesregierung,
2020, https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-de/meta/startseite/the-national-integration-plan-482232.
134
Vera Hanewinkel and Jochen Oltmer, “Integration and Integration Policies in Germany,”
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, January 11, 2018,
https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/262812/integration-and-integration-policies-in-germany.
135
Betts and Collier, Refuge, 89.

Identifying Better Refugee Policies

Rook 53

responsibility itself in exchange with billions of euros and potential membership in the EU.136 To
this day, Turkey’s EU membership is still being negotiated.
In the meantime, Germany made a slew of legislative adjustments to its refugee program.
At first, the German government planned to expand and reinforce refugee programs. On August
1, 2015 the Act to Redefine the Right to Stay and the Termination of Residence re-iterated thr
1993 asylum directive, but also defined residence permit specifications for refugees. 137On
October 24, 2015, the “the Act on the Acceleration of Asylum Procedures entered into force” to
speed up asylum proceedings, reform integration measures once again, and replace in-kind
benefits with cash benefits.138 On November 1, 2015, Germany enacted the Act to Improve the
Housing, Care, and Treatment of Foreign Minors and Adolescents to aid young unaccompanied
refugees. However, new refugee legislation was also focused toward limiting the incoming
asylum seekers to Germany. For example, on February 25, 2016, the German Parliament passed
“Asylum Package II”, which decreased the monthly cash benefits of asylees, increased
Germany’s capacity for deportation, suspended refugee family reunification in certain cases for
two years, and increased the German list of “safe countries”, among other policy alterations.139
Simultaneously, the Integration Act of 2016 was enacted in order to improve Germany’s
vocational training and employment opportunities for refugees.
Although the number of asylum seekers coming to Germany has continued to decline
over the next couple of years, Germany still received 161,900 asylum application in 2018, the
most of any European country. Germany released another mixed package of seven refugee laws
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in response to their high number of asylum seekers and still-struggling refugee program in 2019.
One of these laws, known as the “Orderly Return Law”, made it easier to deport rejected asylum
seekers.140 Another, called the residency obligation rule, restricted refugees’ freedom of
movement by requiring them to live in given the regions of Germany where they were
registered.141 The other laws represented positives for refugees and asylum seekers by increasing
cash benefits for some asylum seekers, allowing refugees to live in reception facilities longer,
and making it easier for skilled foreigners to find jobs.142 Overall, Germany’s latest introduction
of laws presents a peculiar image to the public: it seems that the country’s government wants
fewer unskilled asylum seekers and refugees to enter the country, but it still wants to better
integrate some aspects of life for the refugees that it currently has.
With regard to location, Germany has tried to keep hosting adherent to a distribution
quota. Germany’s distribution system, called the Königstein distribution quota, is weighted by
one-third times “the percentage of the state population as a share of the total population in
Germany” plus two-thirds times “the percentage of state tax revenue as a share of the total
revenue in Germany.”143 Therefore Germany tries to keep an equitable distribution of its 1.1
million refugees around the country based on the population and relative wealth of a given
region. Once refugees are have been allocated, states within Germany must distribute the
refugees within its borders.144 Obviously, this will lead to conflicts between the distribution of
refugees by the German state and the goals of refugees.
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The following map by the Brookings Institute shows the intended concentration of
refugee populations in Germany since 2015:
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Germany’s refugee program has been very cognizant of its weaknesses throughout its
development, and despite certain controversial measures and legal statements, the country has
made a legitimate effort to fully integrate incoming refugee populations with Germany’s native
one. The German government has revamped its refugee policy on numerous occasions in recent
history, which makes its current stances very clear to judge, but also makes it very early to
accurately judge outcomes for the country’s new refugee policies.

Figure 3. This image comes from a map by the 2016 Brookings Institute study called “Cities and
Refugees: The German Experience” to show Germany’s refugee distribution by region in 2015. Image from
https://www.brookings.edu/research/cities-and-refugees-the-german-experience/.
145
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Those afforded refugee protection in Germany receive a residence permit for three years,
may obtain a settlement permit after 3-5 years if other conditions are met, “such as the ability to
make a secure living and adequate knowledge of German”, have unrestricted access to the labor
market, and are entitled to privileged family reunification.146 Refugees also possess “unrestricted
access to the unemployment and welfare package known as Hartz IV [named as such because
these were the final set of labor reforms introduced by the “Hartz Committee” led by Peter
Hartz], for those who are unemployed or have a low-income job and are in need of assistance” as
well as extensive integration courses for language and lifestyle adjustment.147 Naturalization for
refugees in Germany is contingent upon the following factors: staying in Germany for 8 years
legally and without interruptions, obtaining sufficient German language skills (meaning at least
“B1”, or intermediate level), passing a “naturalization test”, being able to cover costs of living
for themselves and their families, and having no past felony convictions.148 This is the same
naturalization process that most foreign nationals in Germany face. Furthermore, “Persons with
refugee status… are entitled to take up vocational training as well as school or university
education, if they can prove that they have the necessary qualifications” and they may receive the
same support for costs of living to do so as German citizens.149 And while refugees are afforded
freedom of travel anywhere in the country, residence rules to maintain equitable refugee
distributions mean that “refugees should, as a rule, be obliged to reside in the town or district to
which they had been accommodated during the asylum procedure” according to most German
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states.150 Germany also possesses strict legal frameworks for refugee non-refoulement, even if it
has been made asylum seekers easier to deport through recent legislation.
Despite Germany’s difficulties in managing its asylum seeker influx in the last few years,
the country has successfully avoided many of the pitfalls of other countries. First, Germany has
had a relatively high political will to host refugees, which means that the federal government was
able to reimburse states to the tune of 8.5 billion Euros in 2016 for integration, hosting, and
program administration.151 Fortunately, the German economy is strong enough to support its
large refugee population and implement programs without relying heavily on foreign aid. The
country also manages to successfully distribute its over 1 million refugees without overburdening
populations through its unique quota system, leaving funding decisions and housing allocation
decisions to municipal and regional governments. On the other hand, one potential downside of
Germany’s funding distribution and delegation of responsibility is that the funding might be used
in more appropriate and efficient ways in some regions than others. While some places like
Berlin and Hamburg have seen success in coordinating service delivery and finding innovative
housing solutions, other places might not have the same success.152 For example, “the local
immigration office in Bavaria has shown a reluctance to grant permits for work or to access to
three-year apprenticeships.”153
The German refugee program also ramped up its mandatory integration program
administration from 2005-2015.154 During this time, refugee program participation percentage in
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Germany also rose.155 Integration programs, including German language programs and financial
literacy programs, have been shown to improve the performance of young refugees in schooling
and to help those in the labor market more easily acquire jobs. Increasing Germany’s budget and
administration for refugee programs seems to be necessary because “it took around 20 years for
earlier waves of refugees to attain the employment rate of the national population”156
and refugee unemployment in Germany with the currently hovers around 40%, which is over
eight times that of the German population.157 Germany also used its vocational training programs
to increase the number of refugees in apprenticeships in 2017 by 140%, but it remains to be
determined if this will be enough to bring the whole population to sustainable levels of living.158
Vocational programs to guide employment pathways are especially important for Germany’s
current employment policy because refugees in the country need to attain an initial work
authorization after arrival contingent “on the premise that their employment doesn’t negatively
affect the employment prospects of German nationals, EU citizens, or permanent residents.”159
Therefore, refugees must find avenues of employment that don’t directly interfere with the
employment chances of Europeans under current policy.
While Germany is slowly improving its employment rate for refugees, statistics show that
50% of incoming refugees will still be unemployed five years after arrival and that this
“percentage is estimated to drop to 25 percent only after 14 years.”160 Meanwhile, the German
government is currently experiencing a labor shortage in both skilled and unskilled labor. To
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remedy this, Germany has tried to recruit skilled and specialized workers from outside the EU to
remedy it on a short-term basis; simultaneously, the country has performed an admirable job of
recruiting refugees into vocational training programs to increase the number of refugees working
in fields of skilled labor. However, a massive untapped potential still exists for unemployed
refugees to perform roles in the labor market because nearly half a million refugees were
looking for work in Germany at the end of 2018.161 Hiring unemployed refugees for unskilled
labor, while educating and providing vocational training for other refugees to fill necessary roles
may prove a more effective long-term solution to Germany’s labor shortage than increasing
foreign recruitment. The development of refugee vocational training has been a huge boon for
refugees in Germany, but many aspects of Germany’s refugee policy still convey mixed signals
about refugee employment.
On the other hand, Germany’s educational inclusion of refugees has been an
unambiguous story of institutional and program-based development. Over the last 5 years, the
country has made primary, secondary, and even tertiary education accessible to refugees. In fact,
only five percent of refugee children were not attending school in 2016, though most were
enrolled in general primary schools.162 It is important to continue emphasizing German language
training for refugees to ensure that they are able to continue advancing through the educational
system and avoid overreliance on special needs classes. Meanwhile, the German Academic
Exchange Service has adopted measures to support refugees as far as tertiary education in
Germany through counselling, supplemental funding, and additional advanced language
training.163 The number of refugees in German universities has reportedly increased 10-fold in
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the last three years, but it remains to be seen how Germany’s increased language training will
continue to support this process.164
The most controversial aspect of German refugee policy, however, is one that does not
fall fully under the purview of this thesis. Nevertheless, it bears mentioning the vast discrepancy
between Germany’s policy for refugees and for asylum seekers. As mentioned before, Germany’s
recent legislation on refugees and asylum seekers has focused primarily on integrating refugees
and restricting the capabilities of asylum seekers. The “Orderly Return Act”, which constituted
part of Germany’s 2019 refugee policy bundle, restricts asylum seekers’ knowledge of
deportation proceedings, gives the government the right to put them into prisons rather than
reception facilities, and reduces their maximum time in reception facilities from 18 months to 6
months.165 Established asylum seekers who speak German and have found work can temporarily
stay in the country and “qualified migrant laborers can now come to Germany for a short time to
look for a job without an employment contract”, but leniency for new asylum seekers is lower
than ever.166 Some reports indicated that the German government discretely separated refugee
arrivals by nationality over the last five years to expedite application processing and the strengths
of different claims.167 In the words of Professor Thomas Groß from the Osnabrück University
Institute of Migration Research and Intercultural Studies, “The basic idea [reflected in the new
legislation] is that only people who were admitted to Germany in the regular procedure of visa
are welcome, but people who came on their own and claimed to be refugees, are not
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welcome.”168 While this thesis deals with the rights of refugees and not asylum seekers, the new
policy package sends the message to potential refugees in Germany that the doors to asylum may
be closing rapidly as refugee legislation changes every few years.
Here is a timeline of Germany’s relevant signed refugee legislation for their refugee
program:
Legislation Year
Implemented
1953
1969
1982

Legislation Name

Description of Legislation

Ratification of the 1951
Refugee Convention
Ratification 1967 Refugee
Protocol
Ratification of the Asylum Act

Established the basic definition of a
refugee
Removed geographic and temporal
restrictions on refugees
Serves as the basis of Germany’s
refugee policy
Reduced the scope for asylum seekers
to apply for asylum in Germany
Acknowledged Germany as a
destination for immigrants
Created a national strategy for refugee
integration based on over 400 measures
Updated and set specific targets for the
National Integration Plan
Reinforced the Asylum Compromise
and defined residence permit
specifications for refugees
Sped up asylum proceedings, reformed
integration, and switched refugee
benefits
Offered support to unaccompanied
refugee minors until adulthood

Passage of the “Asylum
Compromise”
Institution of the Immigration
Act
Passage of the National
Integration Plan
Implementation of the National
Action Plan on Integration
Passage of the Act to Redefine
the Right to Stay and the
Termination of Residence
Passage of the Act on the
Acceleration of Asylum
Procedures
Passage of the Act to Improve
the Housing, Care, and
Treatment of Foreign Minors
and Adolescents
Passage of Asylum Package II

1993
2005
2007
2012
2015

2015

2015

2016
2016

Ratification of the Integration
Act

2019

Passage of Germany’s policy
package

168

Increased deportation measures and
lowered benefits for asylum seekers
Promoted labor market integration
through vocational training and
employment opportunities
Passed 7 separate laws to expedite
deportation of asylum seekers, enable
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entrance of skilled workers, and
improve existing refugee integration

Through an abundance of signed legislation, Germany has made numerous commitments
to refugee rights and services in the country. Germany generally adheres to the mandates of the
1951 Refugee Convention, hosts more than its global share of refugees, and possesses the
resources necessary to provide for them. However, there are two articles of the Refugee
Convention that Germany does not fully obey: Articles 3 (non-discrimination) and 26 (freedom
of movement). Germany discriminates between asylum seekers based on country of origin via
the “Asylum Compromise” because it prevents asylum seekers on the “safe countries” list from
applying for asylum in Germany, even if their asylum claims are valid. Germany also uses
regional hosting services to distribute refugees and places restrictions on them if they choose to
reside elsewhere in the country, though they can travel anywhere they wish. Although the High
Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia ruled the residence obligation for refugees
unconstitutional in 2018, the other regions of the country continue to use this measure.169 While
neither of these acts explicitly violates the 1951 Refugee Convention per se, these policies could
be interpreted as restricting the rights of refugees. Based on German policies toward refugees,
the following are some key recommendations:
First, Germany must remove the part of its Basic Law amended by the “Asylum
Compromise” (in section 16a) that defines a list of “safe countries” from which asylum seekers
cannot apply for asylum in Germany. Preventing persecuted individuals coming from stable
countries from applying for asylum is an act of discrimination that may be convenient for
German asylum decision-making parties, but does not guarantee equal rights for refugees. For
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example, a refugee from one of Germany’s neighbors, like Poland, could not apply for first
asylum in Germany because all EU member states are considered “safe”, even if they have a
valid asylum claim.
Second, Germany must allow refugees to relocate to other areas of the country after their
initial residence permit of three years. Ideally, refugees would be able to move where they wish
in the country, but distributing refugees across the country ensures that they all receive sufficient
housing, programs, and aid. It is within Germany’s rights to distribute refugees to given regions
given their high quantity of refugees, but they cannot force them to stay beyond an initial
adjustment period. Doing so violates refugee freedom of movement.
Third, Germany ought to standardize program administration as well as the criteria for
granting work permits and settlement permits across states. All refugees are not being treated
equally if some areas have a vastly higher rate of work permit distribution and greater access to
integration programs, or vice-versa. A committee must be created by the German federal
government to oversee and standardize regional policies and ensure fair practice for refugees.
Fourth, Germany ought to reinforce its language program administration to ensure that all
refugees stand a reasonable chance of attending higher education or obtaining jobs. So far,
Germany has shown a noticeable improvement in this area, but too many adult refugees remain
unemployed and too many refugee children are forced to attend “special needs” education
programs. Increasing funding in this area would pay massive dividends for refugee economic
integration and economic contribution to Germany.
Fifth, Germany ought to create more employment programs and networks for unskilled
laborers on top of its existing vocational training programs. Together with more advanced
language classes, Germany could address its labor shortage by using the nearly half a million
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unemployed adult refugees across the country. Vocational training programs are doing well to fit
specific gaps in the economy, but a great number of refugees are not able to earn money while
there are spots in the labor market that their skills could fill at this moment.
Sixth, Germany should continue to work via international platforms and incentives in the EU
to establish an equitable responsibility-sharing system for refugees across Europe. Germany is
currently taking on a disproportionate burden compared to the rest of Europe and without any
change in international policy or will, the refugee situation in Europe will remain turbulent.
On a final note, Germany is currently experiencing a rightward shift in politics that has
damaged asylum seekers’ chances of receiving asylum in Germany. It is nearly impossible to
account for future political will, but it is important to note that more rightward shifts in
Germany’s refugee policy will necessarily infringe upon the rights of both refugees and asylum
seekers in the country. The German government ought to keep in mind its international
obligations, their duty of rescue, and the potential economic and social benefits brought by
refugees in order to keep another unconstitutional change of policy in check.

Identifying Better Refugee Policies

Rook 65

Italy.
Italy is another major European host of refugees, but plays a different role from Germany
with regard to the refugees and asylum seekers it receives. From the end of 2018, the refugee
population in Italy was 189, 243.170 Due to Italy’s status as a European coastal nation, it receives
a high number of asylum seekers through the Mediterranean, though the number and country of
origin varies from year to year. According to the BBC, the flow of asylum seekers from 20142017 consisted of first of those “from Tunisia, followed by Eritrea, Sudan, Nigeria, and
Pakistan.”171 In 2018, those from Pakistan comprised the largest part, followed by Nigeria and
Bangladesh.172 While almost all of Italy’s current refugees were asylum seekers entering their
country from either the Mediterranean or Germany who were granted asylum in Italy, the
country has signed on to an EU Refugee Resettlement Plan (similarly to most other countries in
the EU), setting a goal to resettle 1000 refugees from the Middle East and Africa in
2018/2019;173 the resettled refugees were meant to come primarily from Syria, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Palestine, and Sudan with Libya, Turkey, Sudan, Jordan, and Lebanon as their countries of first
asylum.174
It is necessary to make one further distinction before proceeding with respect to Italy’s
refugee history and program. Italy’s population of refugee status holders consists almost
exclusively of asylees. Still, Italy grants the same refugee status and protection to both asylees
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and resettled refugees within the country, so this paper will refer to both categories under the
umbrella term, “refugee” for the remainder of this section.175
Much like Germany, Italy was a country of emigration until the late 20th century. From
1861-1985, over 26 million Italians emigrated from the country, with emigration rates being
greater than immigration rates in nearly every decade.176 Between 1880 and 1915 alone, 13
million people left Italy voluntarily, predominantly for the Americas and other areas of
Europe.177 This actually became a source of concern for the Italian government, which instituted
a number of laws and measures to control emigration into the mid 1900s. During World War II,
the Italian fascist regime reinforced stricter legislation to prevent emigration from the country.178
In essence, the Italian government was not even concerned with immigration of any kind
compared to its emigration wave leading up to the 1940s.
Italy’s first experience with refugees in the modern era, as with most European countries,
occurred in the wake of the Second World War. Immediately after the war, millions of
Europeans were displaced and hundreds of thousands of refugees came to Italy, whether they
were Jews escaping from Eastern Europe, Spaniards escaping from the regime of Franco, or
Italians escaping from ceded territory annexed by Yugoslavia.179 Suddenly, asylum legislation
became a necessity for Italy and in the new Italian Constitution, Article 10 stated that “foreigners
to whom the actual exercise of the democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Italian Constitution is
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denied in their own country, shall be entitled to the right of asylum within the territory of the
Republic, under conditions laid down by law.”180 While this legislation entailed some vague
legal conditions “laid down by law”, Italy finally began to set a humanitarian agenda for asylum
seekers. In 1947, Italy renounced sovereignty over its African colonies and an estimated 206,000
migrants came to Italy from Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia in the country’s
biggest immigrant influx of people from outside of Europe until then.181
Soon thereafter, Italy acquiesced to the 1951 Refugee Convention in 1954, but retained
its geographical limitations on refugee rights for decades. Despite ratifying the 1967 Refugee
Protocol in 1972, Italy still refused to recognize asylum seekers from outside of Europe or grant
them a legal right to work.182 While the Italian government continued to refuse non-European
asylum seekers, the UNHCR “was conducting refugee status determination (RSD) under its
mandate for non-European asylum seekers, usually through interviews conducted at the airport at
the request of the Italian authorities”, effectively performing the Italian government’s refugee
obligations.183
In 1990, Italy enacted Law no. 39, also known as the Martelli Law, which abolished
Italy’s geographic restrictions on refugee protection, “set out the basic rules for asylum
admissions and processing in the country, and created Italy’s first comprehensive immigration
legislative framework.”184 One major flaw of the Martelli Law was that it kept all immigration
in Italy to an emergency-based approach, failing to create enough reception centers for hosting
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and neglecting to enact proper measures for the deportation of incoming migrants and asylumseekers.185 This law was far from perfect, but it formed the basis of Italy’s immigration
programs. From this point onward, the UNHCR continued to work closely with the “Italian
Refugee Council (CIR) to establish a network of information services for asylum seekers at
official arrival points at sea ports and international airports.”186
Italy began to experience its first major mixed migratory flows from the sea at the same
time. In 1991, a tens of thousands of Albanian refugees began arriving on the shores of Puglia in
Italy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The new Italian immigration failed its first test
almost immediately as it forcibly repatriated 21,000 Albanian refugees in August after being
forced to hold them in a football stadium for days.187 It was clear that the new Italian migration
controls were not yet ready to handle large incoming populations of asylum seekers. Until the
late 1990s, the main migrants to arrive in Italy were economic migrants from Tunisia and
Morocco as the channel between North Africa and Sicily began to open.188 Despite relatively few
refugees entering Italy at this time, immigration rates had gradually overtaken emigration rates in
the country.189
In 1998, the Italian government made significant progress in guaranteeing refugee rights
with the passage of the Turco-Napolitano Law, which separated refugee issues from general
immigration issues in the country and began to establish measures for refugee integration in
Italy.190 The country followed this up with the National Asylum Program (PNA) in 2000,
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creating Italy’s “first, fully fledged national framework for the reception of asylum seekers and
refugees.”191 The second Berlusconi government continued to advance the creation of the Italian
refugee program in 2002, establishing the “System for the Protection of Asylum Seekers and
Refugees” (SPRAR) as a national program to oversee Italy’s refugee services, aid with
integration support, and to delegate centers and programs to be run by the local municipalities of
Italy.192 However, establishing SPRAR centers proved too costly to implement quickly, so the
Italian government also instituted extraordinary reception centers (CAS) to most the majority of
refugees and asylum seekers until SPRAR is fully developed. 193
During this time, the UNHCR and an assortment of NGOs continued to aid the Italian
government through the Praesidium Project, founded in 2006. The Praesidium project was a
collaborative effort between the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Italian Red
Cross, Save the Children, the UNHCR, and the Italian Ministry of the Interior for the purpose of
“enabling the provision of information to those who arrived and the identification of appropriate
channels for their reception and access to appropriate legal and administrative procedures.”194
The Praesidium Project was a breakthrough process for multilateral information-sharing to better
allocate funding and improve the country’s capacity to manage mixed migration flows.
Unfortunately, the Praesidium Project was discontinued in June of 2015 for newcomers to Italy
after reported staff shortages.195
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Until 2011, Italy had hosted a relatively low number of refugees and asylum seekers
compared to the rest of Europe. However, the onset of the Arab Spring meant that tens of
thousands of asylum seekers travelled to Italy each year from 2011-2014, a number that
multiplied greatly with the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015.196 Unlike with Germany,
this was not a case of Italy agreeing to take on the refugee crisis as an international commitment.
Rather, it was a consequence of Italy’s position as a coastal European nation, stationed as the
first country of arrival for hundreds of thousands. According to the Migration Policy Institute,
Italy received “154,000 asylum seekers and migrants… in 2015 and 181,000 in 2016.”197 The
Italian reception system was rapidly overwhelmed by the sudden rise in incoming migrants, so
the Italian government adopted a novel “hotspot approach” at the end of 2015. “Hotspots” create
designated areas of disembarkment in Italy to immediately place incoming asylum seekers into
asylum procedure.198 They essentially represent “rebranded” reception centers that have come
under considerable controversy in recent years due to mandatory fingerprinting procedure and
subpar living conditions. Furthermore, incoming foreigners’ claims in hotspots are first evaluated
by police forces, which human rights lawyers contend is a violation of the right to asylum.199
According to Amnesty International, police forces in hotspots sometimes use excessive force to
identify and evaluate incoming asylum seekers and do not utilize comprehensive measures for
accurate refugee status determination.200
In 2017, the Italian government implemented a much less controversial measure when it
passed the country’s first National Integration Plan for persons entitled to international protection
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in Italy. Under this plan, the Italian government finally implemented a comprehensive policy for
developing refugee programs instead of its previous framework for emergency asylum seeker
responses. The National Integration plan implemented new protections for vulnerable groups,
including women and unaccompanied minors, created programs for social, cultural, vocational,
and language-based training services, extended better access to healthcare and housing,
strengthened anti-discrimination enforcement, and formed a National Integration Council to
ensure that targets were being met.201 Perhaps most importantly, the plan intended to move
refugees from large reception centers to fair and equal distributed housing across the country,
accompanied by a corresponding allotment of funds to each area. With this legislation, Italy had
the potential to host one of the most progressive refugee hosting plans in the world.
Unfortunately, Italy mirrored Germany by pairing advanced integration plans with
restrictions for new asylum seekers and refugees. In October 2018, the Italian government passed
a decree that eliminated asylum seekers grounds for asylum on all bases except for political
persecution and war, refusing to give asylum on most internationally decreed humanitarian
grounds. This effectively meant that that the internationally agreed upon grounds for asylum of
persecution basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular
social group no longer applied in Italy. It also accelerated asylum procedures, excluded asylum
seekers from SPRAR centers, and made conditions for obtaining a residency permit more
strict.202 Accordingly, the SPRAR system was renamed to SIPROIMI, or the “Protection System
for Beneficiaries of International Protection and for Unaccompanied Foreign Minors”, which

201
Italy Ministry of the Interior, “National Integration Plan for Persons Entitled to International
Protection,” Italy Ministry of the Interior (Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration , October 2017),
https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/piano_nazionale_integrazione_eng.pdf.
202
“Italy: Revoke Abusive Anti-Asylum Decrees,” Human Rights Watch, January 31, 2020,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/31/italy-revoke-abusive-anti-asylum-decrees.

Identifying Better Refugee Policies

Rook 72

restricted second tier reception facilities to refugees and those offered subsidiary protection,
removing asylum seekers from such protections.
In June 2019, the Italian government signed yet another decree that would allow the
“Minister of the Interior to limit or prohibit the entry of non-military and non-governmental
vessels in Italian territorial waters.”203 This law would effectively make it illegal for asylum
seekers to come to Italy through the Mediterranean, if the Minister of the Interior so chooses.
The purpose of the SPRAR system was to ensure that local institutions all accept a small
number of refugees and asylum seekers, making Italy’s role in managing increasing mixed
migration flows manageable.204 However, with local municipalities being able to choose whether
or not to allow certain numbers of asylum seekers and refugees, the 2017 National Integration
Plan became necessary. While no easily-accessible map exists for Italy’s distribution of refugees
as of SIPROIMI, the below map demonstrates that as of 2016, the concentration of refugees and
asylum seekers within Italy remained focused in the South, as recorded by the former SPRAR
system. It remains to be determined whether this distribution will change notably as the National
Integration Plan takes full effect. In the meantime, refugees in Italy live in small and large
reception centers, housing provided by civil organizations, and previously abandoned houses
provided by small depopulated villages such as Sutera, Riace, and Camini.205206 To this day,
initial housing decisions for both resettled refugees and refugees granted asylum by Italy occur
through the discretion of SIPROIMI if they wish to benefit from free housing.
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The following map shows Italy’s distribution of asylum seekers across the country as a
function of the total population of each region:

207

While Italy has a variety of systems in place meant for managing asylum seeker entry and
registration, Italy’s initial centers to provide services for refugees are SIPROIMI projects and the
subsequent services that it pledges to create, monitor, and sustain are those created by the 2017
National Integration Plan. After either receiving asylum in first-line government reception
centers or being resettled from another country, refugees in Italy are entitled to free housing in
SIPROIMI projects for an initial 6 months, which may be extended to 12 months if deemed
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Figure 4. This image comes from a map in the 2018 article “Who welcomes them? Determinants of the
spatial distribution of asylum seekers in Italy” by Ugo Fratesi, Marco Percoco & Paola Proietti, using SPRAR data
to determine Italy’s distribution of asylum seekers in 2015. Image from
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necessary to complete the person’s integration trajectory or to care for extraordinary
circumstances such as health problems or vulnerabilities.208 SIPROIMI projects are
accommodation facilities that exist in order to offer programs such as “language courses, work
integration programs, psychological support, legal counselling and other services” to refugees.209
SIPROIMI projects dictate in which centers refugees get to live; if a refugee chooses to live
elsewhere, they forfeit access to the services and protections of SIPROIMI. After the expiration
of SIPROIMI services, refugees may seek public housing (as they have the same rights to public
housing as Italian nationals) through the Italian government, social housing via private
accommodation facilities owned by catholic or voluntary associations, or they may purchase
private housing if they have the financial means to do so.210 Unfortunately, there is currently no
housing solution in place for refugees between SIPROIMI accommodation and acceptance of an
application to public or private housing in a municipality.211 However, the Italian government
affords full freedom of movement to refugees within the country and they may choose to reside
in any municipality if they can provide for themselves.212
Upon receiving refugee status, refugees in Italy are granted 5 year residence permits.
These permits are renewable, but require a registered address to be provided to the police, which
can be difficult for refugees residing in organization-provided housing because not all Questuras
[General Headquarters of Internal Police] “accept an organization’s address as domicile and also
the organisations not always allow beneficiaries of protection to use their address.”213 The
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primary reason for the rejection residence permit renewals is the commission of felonies.
Residence permits also allow refugees full access to the labor market, including work, public
employment, and “the same treatment as Italian citizens in matters of employment, selfemployment, subscription to professional bodies, vocational training, including refresher
courses, for training in the workplace and for services rendered by employment centres.”214
However, the administration of additional programs to support refugee community involvement
and training occur at the discretion of local municipalities and NGO service provision to this day.
Refugees can obtain long-term resident status after residing in Italy for over 5 years and
possessing “an income equal or higher than the minimum income guaranteed by the State.”215
Refugees are also afforded additional leniency in case of vulnerabilities for the income
requirement, as living in a free dwelling provided by a charity or aid organization can contribute
up to 15% of the income requirement.216 Italy does not require refugees to prove their language
proficiency for long-term residency nor do refugees have to prove the hygiene and health
conditions of their accommodations, unlike other third country nationals. The Italian government
also allows access to naturalization for refugees. Refugees may apply for citizenship after five
years of uninterrupted legal residence. Other requirements for naturalization include knowledge
of the Italian language (at a B1, or intermediate level) and a demonstration of sufficient social
inclusion.217 According to the Asylum Information Database, “as evidence of social inclusion, it
is usually requested that the income of the last 3 years be equal or higher than the minimum
income guaranteed by the State.”218
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With regard to education, the Italian government supplies refugees with adequate access
to primary and secondary education, but so far has failed to utilize the educational measures set
out by the National Integration Plan, as has been the case with vocational and language training.
According to Italian law, all minors in the country under the age of 16 of any legal status possess
the right to education. Meanwhile, refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary protection have the
same rights to education as other non-citizens in Italy. As it stands, Italian law “does not allow
the establishment of special classes for foreign students” and advises the administration of Italian
language labs, but does not require them.219 Therefore, it is primarily the decision of regional and
local school boards whether to adjust academic curricula in order to accommodate foreign
students. The Italian government has begun to offer scholarships for refugees in tertiary
education only as of 2018 for those whose studies were interrupted in their country of origin.220
Otherwise, the responsibility of providing additional educational aid and programs to refugees
has fallen on NGOs and private actors.
Although the Italian government gives small sums of monthly financial support to asylum
seekers until their decisions are rendered, refugees do not receive additional funding from the
Italian government as of six months after their asylum decision is rendered.221 Consequently,
refugees receive the same access to healthcare and social security as other Italian nationals from
that point onward. This means that under the new Universal basic income system in Italy, most
refugees do not qualify because its provision in Italy requires ten years of legal residence in the
country.222 Furthermore, in order to receive Universal basic income, applicants must have an
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income below a certain level, have no real-estate above a given value abroad or in Italy, and they
must not possess valuable movables. This has proven incredibly problematic for refugees
because in recent cases, the Italian National Institute of Social Security (INPS) “even suspended
the application of recognised refugees who were unable to show proof of fulfilment of the
economic preconditions from their country of origin.”223 In practice, Italy has made it incredibly
difficult for refugees gain access to social welfare.
Overall, Italy’s refugee program succeeds in securing basic rights for refugees and
granting them immediate support through SIPROIMI projects. In many cases, refugees legally
have the same access to services as Italian citizens, including education, access to employment,
freedom of movement, and more. Many small Italian towns that had become farming villages
due to depopulation have benefited from “refugees, who are also thriving in their new
environments by opening up businesses, increasing demand for goods, filling homes, and paying
taxes” all over the south of Italy.224 The Italian government has even recently passed it National
Integration Plan framework to give better long-term support to refugees through comprehensive
programs and switch from their emergency-based hosting approach of the past. If the programs
within the National Integration plan could be utilized to improve the housing options,
employment opportunities, access to welfare, and access to educational and integration-based
programs, the Italy’s refugee program has the potential to be one of the most progressive and
noteworthy in the world.
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However, the current “Italian system is based on the assumption that people with
protection status can and must take care of themselves.”225 Italy as a coastal nation has spent so
much effort and resources on managing inflows of asylum seekers and migrants that the refugees
who have either been resettled to Italy or have been granted asylum within the country are often
left ignored. Italy’s primary system to provide services for refugees at the moment is SIPROIMI,
which provides comprehensive care, aid, housing and programs through SIPROIMI projects, but
only serves refugees for 6-12 months. After that point, refugees must find housing, search for
employment, receive an education, apply for social services, and potentially strive for
naturalization without government support. Italy’s unemployment rate was 10% as of 2019 and
much higher for youth populations, access to public housing in the country can take up to a few
years, and it takes more than 6-12 months of language training to become proficient in a new
language.226 As a result, the emergency-based Italian approach to hosting has led to massive
problems of homelessness, irregular labor, and a lack of integration for refugees across much of
the country.227
Furthermore, current asylum seekers arriving to Italy must face an administration that
does not want to accept more migrants of any kind. Former Deputy Prime Minister of Italy,
Matteo Salvini, was recently ousted from government in September of 2019 and put on trial for
illegally preventing over 116 migrants from disembarking in Sicily for close to a week.228 During
his time as Deputy Prime Minister, Salvini was responsible for passing multiple laws that limited
the rights of asylum seekers as well as their ability to land on Italian soil. For instance, renaming
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SPRAR for SIPROIMI in October 2018 did more than merely change the name of Italy’s
second-line reception facilities; it removed asylum seekers from the second-line of Italian
reception altogether, taking away their access to basic rights and services, but leaving some aid
such as emergency healthcare. Additionally, limiting the grounds upon which asylum seekers
could apply for asylum in Italy constitutes a breach of the 1951 Refugee Convention. And while
some small rural villages in Italy are happy to accept refugees to boost their economies, regions
such as Friuli-Venezia Giulia restricted access to public housing to those who had not lived in
Italy for at least five years, preventing potential refugees from entering.229 On top of that, the
regions of Gorina, Ferrara, and Emilia-Romagna forcefully expelled asylum seekers from their
territories in 2016.230 Italy’s unwelcoming political climate could serve as a major inhibition to
Italian refugee policy moving forward.
Given Italy’s focus on managing asylum seekers and developing asylum seeker policy in
recent years, it is especially surprising how poor their reception system for asylum seekers has
been. The UNHCR has expressed concerns at the ill-treatment of asylum seekers in reception
facilities, including excessive force by police, substandard living conditions, and limited
facilities for women and unaccompanied minors.231 The Swiss Refugee Council has commented
on the lack of acceptable reception facilities for people with health problems, “and too few
adequate treatment options and available accommodation for the mentally ill in particular.”232 In
addition, a report from the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies has commented on the
formation of informal migrant settlements along the coast of Italy over the last decade for those
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who either left their reception centers or never entered them in the first place.233 While the Italian
government does not recognize these impromptu refugee camps, some NGOs and humanitarian
organizations still provide support to them. This shows that the Italian government still requires
more funding, better oversight, more comprehensive programs, and a stronger policy framework
to support arriving asylum seekers.
Here is a timeline of Italy’s relevant signed refugee legislation for their refugee program:
Legislation Year
Implemented
1948
1954
1972
1990

Legislation Name

Description of Legislation

Enactment of the Italian
Constitution, Article 10
Ratification of the 1951
Refugee Convention
Ratification of the 1967
Refugee Protocol
Passage of the Martelli Law

Established Italy’s first asylum law

1998

Passage of the TurcoNapolitano Law

2000

Creation of the “National
Asylum Program”

2002

Implementation of the
“System for the Protection
of Asylum Seekers and
Refugees” (SPRAR)
Adoption of the “Hotspot
Approach”
Creation of the National
Integration Plan
Passage of the Decree,
“Urgent measures on

2015
2017
2018

Established the basic definition of a
refugee
Removed geographic and temporal
restrictions on refugees*
abolished Italy’s geographic restrictions on
refugee protection, set out the basic rules
for asylum admissions and processing in
the country, and created Italy’s first
comprehensive immigration legislative
framework
separated refugee issues from general
immigration issues in the country and
began to establish measures for refugee
integration in Italy
created Italy’s first, fully fledged national
framework for the reception of asylum
seekers and refugees
oversaw Italy’s refugee services, aided
with integration support, and delegated
centers and programs to be run by the local
municipalities of Italy
created designated areas of disembarkment
in Italy
formulated Italy’s first national refugee
integration framework
accelerated asylum procedures, excluded
asylum seekers from SPRAR centers, and
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international protection,
restricted residency permit conditions,
immigration, and public
changed grounds for asylum, and more
security”
2019
Passage of the Decree,
made it possible to reject sea arrivals on
“Urgent measures
Italian soil
concerning public security
and order”
*Italy’s refused to remove geographical restrictions on refugees at the time
As mentioned previously, Italy offers all basic rights to refugees in theory, but due to an
emergency-based approach to hosting, does not provide sufficient programs to help them adjust
to their new country. Italy essentially gives refugees the same rights as citizens, but makes them
survive on their own at an extremely disadvantaged position to most native Italians. Furthermore,
the country restricts the rights and living conditions of asylum seekers, creating an inhospitable
environment for migrants of all kinds coming into the country. Of the articles in the 1951
Refugee Convention observed by this thesis, the only one that Italy openly disobeys is Article
33, the right to non-refoulement. Italy’s 2018 decree, “Urgent measures on international
protection, immigration, and public security”, restricted the grounds by which an asylum seeker
may seek asylum to political persecution and war, unjustly returning asylum seekers applying for
asylum on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, or social group membership to their home
countries. Any other violations of the 1951 Refugee Convention on the basis of employment,
education, freedom of movement, or naturalization, occur not because of laws violating those
rights, but due to a lack of adequate programs to ensure those rights. As a result of Italy’s policies
toward refugees, here are some key recommendations:
First, it is essential that Italy enacts the 2017 National Integration plan in its entirety. Despite
passing the plan nearly three years ago, a 2020 UNHCR report states that “most of the
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recommendations and policy measures contained therein have not yet been implemented.”234
Enacting the Integration Plan would ensure that refugees have a fighting chance to survive in
Italy beyond their first 6-12 months in SIPROIMI projects. For example, administering language
training programs to all refugees, as set out in the Integration Plan, would allow minors to
perform better in the Italian education system, adults to look for jobs in the formal labor market,
and give all refugees a better chance of once day attaining Italian citizenship. Additionally,
expanding access to housing by extending “access to the available housing solutions, by making
the provision of services homogeneous across the country and developing minimum standards
for access to residential services” and expanding social housing for those in informal refugee
settlements, as dictated by the Integration Plan, would represent a massive leap in solving Italian
refugee homelessness.235
Second, the Italian government ought to reform its access to Universal Basic Income for
refugees. Whether this takes place by abolishing the five year residence requirement for only
those individuals who have taken part in SIPROIMI projects, or simply continuing the stipend
given to asylum seekers in the country for those with refugee status, impoverished refugees
without access to employment need income to survive until they are able to find work.
Third, the Italian government must repeal the 2018 decree, “Urgent measures on
international protection, immigration, and public security”. This decree limits the rights of
asylum seekers and violates Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Changing the grounds
upon which an asylum seeker may apply for asylum is a blatant violation of agreed-upon
international legislation and must be remedied.
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Fourth, the Italian government must repeal the 2019 decree, “Urgent measures
concerning public security and order”. Allowing Italy’s interior minister to delay or refuse the
disembarkation of migrants of any kind on Italy’s coast is a violation of the right to life and the
obligation to “seek and facilitate humanitarian action.”236 As mentioned before, former Italian
Deputy Prime Minister Salvetti is currently on trial because he nearly let over 100 migrants die
trapped at sea as a direct result of this decree.
Fifth, the Italian government ought to work in conjunction with the UNHCR,
International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Italian Red Cross, and Save the Children to
reinstate the Praesidium Project. For nine years, the Praesidium Project helped to provide
multilateral information-gathering and monitoring of Italy’s reception facilities. It also gave
asylum seekers access to legal and administrative procedures so that they could secure their
rights and learn how to navigate the Italian asylum system. In 2015, the program was shut down
due to staff shortages. However, with adequate funding, a renewed Praesidium project could
inform the Italian government on how to improve its reception facilities, advise asylum seekers
about their rights, and teach the government, NGOs, and private investors regarding where to
allocate funding.
Finally, Italy ought to abolish its “Hotspot Approach” and improve the quality of its
reception facilities. The country’s hotspot approach to manage newcomers has severely hindered
living conditions for asylum seekers, created questionable practices of identification and law
enforcement, and not provided adequate services for the most vulnerable asylum seekers. Italy
must provide adequate housing to provide for unaccompanied minors and asylum seekers with
physical or mental illness, but those services are not currently in place.
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Hungary.
Hungary has performed an entirely different role from Germany or Italy when it comes to
refugee hosting. While Germany leaned toward the voluntary acceptance of refugees and Italy
accepted refugees as a consequence of its geographical position, Hungary has attempted to reject
refugees outright. The refugee population of Hungary as of 2018 was 6,040.237 The country
received 468 asylum applications in 2019, only 22 of which were granted refugee status, with
refugees from the Middle East encountering a rejection rate close to 100%.238 According to NGO
reports, Hungary only allows up to two asylum seekers per day and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán
has refused to take part in the EU refugee resettlement program, setting no quota for refugee
resettlement.239 Because Hungary contains virtually no resettled refugees, this thesis will once
again use the term “refugee” to apply to both asylees and resettled refugees within the country.
Over the last decade, Orbán’s administration has used every measure in its power, including legal
measures, propaganda, and even physical force to deny migrants of all kinds from entering the
country.
It wasn’t long ago that Hungarian refugees relied on the rest of the world for protection.
After the Second World War, Hungarian fell under the rule of the Soviet Union as part of the
famed “Iron Curtain.” Under the Soviet system of Communism and authoritarian oppression,
tensions rose until a Hungarian student protest led to a protest of tens of thousands in the streets
of Budapest on October 23rd, 1956. The Hungarian military joined the protests and by October
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29 there were signs that the Soviet military was beginning to withdraw from the country.240 This
wasn’t to last, however. On November 4, 1956, Soviet tanks poured back into Hungary and many
Hungarian revolutionaries saw that the battle could not be won; within days, thousands of
Hungarians were killed in the initial conflict, thousands more arrested, hundreds subsequently
executed, and hundreds of buildings were destroyed.241 Over the next nine weeks, approximately
200,000 Hungarian refugees fled Hungary to Austria and Yugoslavia, charging the newly formed
UNHCR with one of its first ever tasks of refugee resettlement. By 1959, the UNHCR had
resettled the refugees of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution to over 37 countries, with countries in
Europe, North America, South America, Africa, and Oceania welcoming them.242 By the early
1960s, no Hungarian refugees were left in camps and the UNHCR has its first major success in
refugee resettlement.243
After the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the Soviet Union regained its control over the
country and enacted strict controls over both immigration and emigration. According to the
Migration Policy Institute, “emigration was only permitted in exceptional cases. Immigration
was also limited, and tended to be restricted to intergovernmental agreements, family
reunification (often with false marriages to obtain immigration papers), and admissions based on
political decisions.”244 While a small number of asylum seekers entered Hungary following the
Greek civil war and the 1973 Chilean coup, Hungarian borders stayed restricted and refugee
policy had not solidified in Hungary.245
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With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, Hungary regained its independence at last and
instituted measures to drastically reform its government and economic policies. On March 14 of
1989, Hungary signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol. However,
Hungary retained a geographical restriction on the 1967 Refugee Protocol so that it only
recognized claims of refugees in Europe. During the mid to late 1990s, the only asylum seekers
coming to Hungary were waves of Yugoslavs fleeing armed conflicts and approximately 30,000
Romanian citizens, who were predominantly ethnic Hungarians.246 Still Hungary had a positive
migration balance in the 1990s, with tens of thousands of asylum seekers entering and very few
Hungarians leaving the country.247
In March 1998, the Hungarian government passed the Act on Asylum. The Act eliminated
Hungary’s geographic restriction on asylum-seekers and established the decision-making
procedures for refugees and asylees within the country. After the passage of this the Act on
Asylum, Hungary began to accept asylum applicants primarily from Bangladesh, Afghanistan,
and Iraq over the next few years.248 The government passed yet another legislative package on
asylum seekers and migrants in 2002. These new policies aligned Hungary’s policies for
residence permits with those of the EU, including “a minimum of three years working and living
in Hungary with a residence permit… to obtain a settlement permit” and “eight years of
residence… for naturalization.”249 After this alignment, Hungary joined the European Union in
2004.
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In 2007, Hungary enacted the Law on Asylum in 2007 and established its Office of
Immigration and Nationality. Beyond asylum procedure alone, this law provided the first
reception and integration-based services for refugees in Hungary to be implemented by the
newly established office. 250 Still, Hungary received a relatively small number of asylum
applications at this time, with less than 10,000 applicants per year from 2000-2012.251 The
country retained a relatively low approval rate for these applicants (less than 10% received
refugee status) and routinely showed preferential treatment to returning ethnic Hungarians.
Despite latent attitudes of xenophobia in the country, Hungary remained in line with its
international obligations toward refugees.
With the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis, Hungary quickly changed its tune. In 2013
alone, Hungary received 18,900 asylum seekers, a number that increased to 177,135 by 2015.252
In a large part, this change occurred because Hungary was a stop on the asylum seeker route to
Germany after Merkel had announced that the country was opening its doors. Hungary very
quickly found itself becoming overwhelmed with a sudden asylum seeker wave of this
magnitude and reacted both promptly and severely. First, the Hungarian government
strengthened the Asylum Act in 2013 with a number of amendments to give the Office of
Immigration and Nationality more comprehensive grounds for the detention of asylum seekers;
NGO’s like the Hungarian Helsinki Committee were concerned that these grounds were too
vague and might “fail to carry out a proper individual assessment of the cases before subjecting
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an asylum-seeker to detention.”253 When Hungary realized that these amendments did nothing to
deter asylum seekers from entering the country, the government enacted a number of more
drastic measures in September of 2015. First, Hungary erected a fence along the country’s border
with Serbia and Croatia to prevent “irregular migrants” from entering the country, restricting
asylum applications to two access points in the country. Second, Hungary criminalized entry
through the border fence as punishable by three to ten years in prison.254 Third, Hungary applied
the “safe third country” rule to Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia, meaning that any asylum seeker
going to Hungary who passed through any of those three countries must apply for asylum there
first, although “no other EU Member State applies a presumption of safety to those countries.”255
Finally and perhaps most importantly, Hungary declared a “state of crisis due to mass migration”
in the two counties bordering Serbia, which allowed Hungary to apply “special rules” to
incoming asylum-seekers and ignore certain provisions of the Asylum Act.256 In addition,
Hungary closed its largest reception center for asylum-seekers, which was located in the town of
Debrecen.257
In March of 2016, Hungary extended its “state of crisis” to the entire country and plans to
continue this until at least September of 2020. Three months later, the Hungarian government
decided to withdraw integration services to all beneficiaries of international protection, “thus
leaving recognised refugees… to destitution and homelessness” and entrusting all integration
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programs entirely to NGOs and the private sector.258 Furthermore, Viktor Orbán repeatedly
rejected the European Union’s program for refugee resettlement. When the EU asked Hungary to
resettle 1,294 refugees from Italy and Greece, Viktor Orbán spent 28 million euros on an antiimmigrant campaign instead and when the EU asked Hungary to set a quota for refugee
resettlement, Orbán nearly passed a referendum to outlaw EU-mandated settlement, but failed
due to a narrow rejection from the Parliament.259 After the failure of the referendum, the
Hungarian government doubled down on measures for refugee restriction. This included the
recruitment of 3,000 “border hunters” to reinforce Hungary’s newly constructed fence as well as
the closure of most of the country’s remaining refugee camps.260
Hungary’s strategy to throttle immigration of all kinds was apparently successful, as
Hungary received 29,432 asylum seekers in 2016, 3,397 in 2017, 671 in 2018, and only 468 in
2019, while continuing to deny all refugee resettlement.261262 Despite only 300-400 asylum
seekers staying in Hungary as of 2017, the country has remained in a state of crisis since that
point.263 Additionally, the acceptance rate of asylum seekers remains exceedingly low in
Hungary, with only 3.1% of asylum applicants gaining refugee status in 2019.264 Meanwhile, “in
2019, 11,101 migrants were pushed back from the territory of Hungary to the external side of the
border fence and 961 were blocked entry at the border fence.”265 Viktor Orbán has effectively
managed to insulate Hungary from all potential migrants, declaring incoming Muslim asylum
seekers as “Muslim invaders” and striving to keep Hungary’s population “pure”. He is in his
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fourth term as Prime Minister of Hungary and continues to use authoritarian policies to
legitimize his power within the country, often against the wishes of the European Union.
Even for refugees and asylum seekers who have somehow managed to gain access to the
country, Hungary has made it difficult to find support. Although NGOs estimate that the
Hungarian government only allows up to two asylum applications per day, those that enter no
longer receive support from foreign NGOs or the Office of Immigration and Nationality. In June
2018, the Hungarian government passed the “Stop Soros” package of bills, which states that any
individuals or groups who provide assistance to “irregular migrants” in the country may be
subject to imprisonment and any activities “supporting immigration” would be taxed 25%.266
Thereby, charitable donors, organizations, and volunteers are subject to criminal charges for such
assistance, though some legal organizations such as the Hungarian Helsinki Committee continue
to provide legal aid. In July of 2019, the Office of Immigration and Nationality established in
2007 was abolished in favor of the “National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing”
(NDGAP), delegating all asylum matters within the country to a branch organization within the
Police.267 In effect, Hungary has endeavored to absolve itself of programs and policies for
asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants as a whole.
Asylum seekers coming to Hungary may only enter the country through the two transit
zones in the South of the country, Röszke and Tompa, which are only open to accept asylum
applications during business hours.268 It is nearly impossible to enter elsewhere because 3,000
“border hunters” routinely patrol a “100-mile-long, four-meter-high, razor-wire-topped fence
erected on Hungary’s southern borders with Serbia and Croatia to keep refugees out.”269
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Reportedly, the vast majority of incoming asylum seekers are detained in these transit zones and
denied access to freedom of movement during that time until a decision in their placement and
status is carried out.270 As of 2019, Hungary maintains two open reception centers
(Vámosszabadi and Balassagyarmat), one home for unaccompanied children (Fót), and only one
functioning closed asylum detention facility (Nyírbátor), but nearly all incoming asylum seekers
are left detained in Röszke and Tompa.271 After receiving their status determination, asylees may
only stay in reception facilities for 30 days before needing to find their own homes; most choose
to go to Budapest, as that is where the majority of remaining NGOs and assistance programs for
refugees are concentrated.272 Therefore, while Hungary does give refugees the right to freedom
of movement after their status has been issued, most of Hungary’s refugee population lives in
Budapest. Hungary’s shelters, reception centers, and asylum facilities are scattered around the
country, but most of Hungary’s asylum seekers remain detained in transit zones, as demonstrated
by the below map of Hungary’s facilities.
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273

For those few refugees in Hungary who are able to gain recognized refugee status, life
seldom becomes easier. After refugee status determination, refugees are meant to be issued a
Hungarian ID, which must be reviewed and renewed every three years. According to the law, it
should take 20 days to issue a personal identification card, but in practice it takes at least one
month to do so.274 As refugees are only allowed to remain in open reception facilities for 30
days, this means that they are often forced out of reception facilities before they receive their
personal identification card, restricting access to employment and accommodation until that
time. In past, reception centers in Hungary such as Bicske offered accommodation for recognized
refugees for a total of six months as they adjust to their new lives, but Viktor Orbán closed those
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Figure 5. This image comes from a map by the International Organization of Migration demonstrating
the type and capacity of Hungary’s detention centers and reception facilities in 2016. Image from
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reception facilities at the end of 2016.275 As a result of restrictive accommodation laws, the
remaining reception facilities in Hungary are currently operating at less than 2% of their
capacity.276 Meanwhile, refugees in Hungary experience almost certain homelessness unless they
rely on support from non-governmental civil organizations such as the Menedék Association to
provide them with housing, job opportunities, and a chance at integration.277
Nevertheless, Hungary does allow its refugees pathways to long-term residence and
naturalization. Hungary allows refugees who have lived in Hungary for three consecutive years
to apply for long-term residence status.278 While long-term residence status is indefinite, the
documents for the long-term residence permit must be renewed every five years. The
requirements for naturalization for refugees are three years of uninterrupted residence in the
country, a clean criminal record, their naturalization not being a “threat to public policy or to the
national security of Hungary”, and proof that they passed the Hungarian basic constitutional
studies exam to demonstrate language proficiency.279 All of these terms may seem achievable,
but both long-term residence status and naturalization primarily require refugees to live in a
stable accommodation despite the Hungarian government not possessing any institutions to
support housing opportunities for refugees. Furthermore, being a “threat to public policy” is a
vague qualification for citizenship, especially in a country with a xenophobic atmosphere and
passing the Hungarian language exam is difficult when the government does not provide any
supplemental educational services to refugees.
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Both unaccompanied minors and refugee children with families possess the right to a
primary and secondary education in Hungary. However, only a limited number of public schools
in Hungary provide access to unaccompanied minors and “there is no official state-funded
language learning support for refugee children when entering the school system.”280 As of 2019,
even NGO support for language-programs is limited due to the cancellation of the Menedék
Association school program.281 Furthermore, with strong anti-refugee sentiment in the country,
refugee children often receive ridicule from their peers. Taking all of these factors into account,
obtaining a high-quality formal education in Hungary remains practically unfeasible.
Unfortunately, these same barriers exist for adults in the labor market. Adults are entitled
to the same vocational training programs as Hungarian nationals and also possess the same
access to the labor market by law.282 However, vocational training programs are given in
Hungarian and no further assistance for language programs is given by the government. Instead,
charities and volunteer organizations are the only institutions that provide language learning
opportunities to refugees and they risk punitive action from the government on the basis of the
“Stop Soros” bills in doing so.283 This lack of access to educational programs, vocational
training, and language programs leads to difficulties in the labor market. Hungarians are
unwilling to provide jobs to foreigners, especially when they do not speak Hungarian and haven’t
been able to undergo the necessary training to do technical jobs. Although no statistics currently
exist for refugee employment in Hungary, NGOs such as the Menedék association have noted
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that this leads to refugees being forced into jobs for which they are overqualified, often resorting
to sectors such as physical labor.284
With regard to government supplied benefits such as social welfare and healthcare,
Hungary once again treats recognized refugees under the same category as Hungarian nationals.
On one hand, this means that refugees receive “limited public health care and unemployment
benefit, amongst other entitlements e.g. family allowances, sickness and maternity benefits.”285
On the other hand, refugees must demonstrate years of residence to apply for public housing and
they must show at least one year of employment over a period of three years to make use of job
seekers’ benefits.286 No government programs exist for financial or legal literacy in Hungary and
without proper knowledge of the Hungarian language, refugees must once again rely heavily
upon the limited assistance of NGOs to familiarize them with Hungary’s welfare and healthcare
systems. Before July 2019, it was the duty of the Office of Immigration and Nationality along
with the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF) in Hungary to institute these
programs, but with the abolishment of the both the office and calls for funding proposals by the
AMIF, Hungary’s refugee programs have effectively ceased to exist. In the words of Gábor
Gyulai, director of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee’s Refugee Program, “After the [initial] 30
days [in a reception center], it's the end. You have to leave, and you don't get anything. There is
no housing. There is no financial support. There is no schooling allowance. There is no
integration support. There is no Hungarian language course or help with finding a job. The state
doesn't provide anything”.287 The UNHCR and humanitarian NGOs have repeatedly brought up
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concerns about Hungary’s refugee program since 2015, but no substantive action has been taken
against the country yet.
Taking into account Hungary’s recent policies and measures to divert and deprive asylum
seekers and refugees, there is no single policy that can be changed to fix Hungary’s refugee
program. Rather, the biggest problem with Hungary’s refugee policy is the political mindset of
outright xenophobia that has guided Hungary’s policymaking. Viktor Orbán’s political party,
Fidesz, currently holds 116 seats of the 119 in Hungary’s parliament, with no other party holding
more than 26.288 This is not likely to change soon. Viktor Orbán has built his nationalist platform
over his 16 years as Prime Minister of Hungary upon a fear and hatred of foreigners in favor of
the strength of the Hungarian people. Hungary’s refugee policy does not even reflect a disregard
for refugees necessarily, but a distaste for anything non-Hungarian. As an example, Hungary
accepted over 300 refugees from Venezuela in 2018 as long as they could prove that they were of
Hungarian descent.289 These refugees “have been generously received, with enrollment in
language classes and accommodation and integration for the first 12 months.”290 Despite any
previously signed international legislation, Hungary’s refugee policy is unlikely to change from
within in the coming years, at least toward foreigners of non-Hungarian descent.
Nevertheless, here is a timeline of Hungary’s relevant signed refugee legislation for their
refugee program:
Legislation Year
Implemented
1989

Legislation Name

Description of Legislation

Ratification of the 1951
Refugee Convention and 1967
Refugee Protocol

established the basic definition of a
refugee and removed geographic and
temporal restrictions on refugees*
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Passage of the Asylum Act

eliminated the geographic restriction on
asylum-seekers and established asylum
procedures within the country
2002
Institution of a legislative
aligned Hungarian refugee policy with
package on migrants
that of the EU
2007
Passage of the Asylum Law
Created Hungary’s first reception and
integration-based services for refugees
along with the Office of Immigration
and Nationality
2013
Amendments to the Asylum Act clarified and increased grounds for the
detention of asylum seekers
2015
Passage of emergency
erected a fence along the country’s
directives on asylum
border with Serbia and Croatia,
restricted asylum applications to two
access points in the country,
criminalized entry through the border
fence as punishable by three to ten
years in prison, applied the “safe third
country” rule to Greece, Macedonia,
and Serbia, declared a “state of crisis
due to mass migration”, and closed the
country’s largest reception center for
asylum-seekers
2016
Passage of additional directives extended Hungary’s “state of crisis”,
for asylum-seekers, refugees,
withdrew integration services for
and national security
refugees, and closed the majority of
Hungary’s reception centers
2018
Implementation of the “Stop
criminalized aid to irregular migrants
Soros” legislative package
and taxed support for immigrants of
any kind by 25%
2019
Abolition of the Office of
transitioned all control of migrant
Immigration and Nationality in matters to national law-enforcement
favor “National DirectorateGeneral for Aliens Policing”
*Hungary retained a geographic restriction of refugees to Europe
Hungary gives refugees their rights neither in theory nor in practice. Previous Hungarian
asylum legislation has endowed the country with a bare skeleton of human rights legislation, but
gives them none of the necessary tools for self-sufficiency or integration. Hungary has violated
the 1951 Refugee Convention and in 2020 the European Court of Justice declared the country
guilty of breaches in the “EU’s asylum laws and basic rights charter” for restrictions on asylum
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and inhumane treatment of asylum seekers, but the country seems unperturbed by and defiant
against these rulings.291 Nevertheless, Hungary has violated Articles 3, 33, and 34 of the 1951
Refugee Convention outright in addition to Articles 18 and 22 in practice. Hungary has violated
Article 3 regarding freedom from discrimination by showing preferential treatment to ethnic
Hungarian refugees with regard to the provision of integration services and criminalizing aid to
non-Hungarian migrants through the “Stop Soros” legislative package. Hungary has violated
Article 33 for the right to non-refoulement by returning asylum seekers coming through Greece,
Macedonia, and Serbia, detaining refugees in transit zones without adequate access to food,
imprisoning and assaulting those who don’t arrive through transit zones, and creating arbitrary
grounds for the rejection of asylum seekers via directives passed in 2015 and 2016. The
Hungarian government has violated Article 34 by refusing to provide for the assimilation of
refugees in Hungary in any way, denying access to integration services in 2016 and resigning
matters to do with immigration to police control in 2019. This refusal to accommodate nonHungarian-speaking refugees with services of any kind has denied them the right to wageearning employment, education, and naturalization under Articles 18 and 22. As a result of
Hungary’s policies and programs for refugees, this thesis offers the following recommendations:
First, the United Nations, the European Union, and national government bodies must hold
the Hungarian government accountable for its behavior toward refugees. Hungary has displayed
a clear disobedience of international guidelines in its actions along with an open defiance of
requests to change its behavior and share the responsibility of refugee hosting. The United
Nations and national governments must threaten Hungary with more serious sanctions at this
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point if the country is to abide by its signed international legislation. If Hungary refuses to
comply, it may become necessary for the European Union to remove Hungary’s voting rights if
the country continues to abuse international human rights.
Secondly, Hungary ought to repeal all of the asylum decrees mentioned above starting in
2015. Hungary is clearly not in a “state of crisis due to mass migration” and should not be
allowed to ignore international obligations on that basis. Hungary must remove its numerous
restrictions on asylum seeker applications, stop its refusal of European Union-mandated refugee
resettlement, withdrawal of integration services for refugees, indictment of organizations helping
immigrants of all kinds, and police management of asylum seekers if it is to follow the 1951
Refugee Convention. All of these directives and laws work directly against the security of
international human rights.
Third, Hungary must establish government-created integration services that provide for
the self-sufficiency of refugees in the country. Signing into law a new Refugee Law that creates
language, financial literacy, educational, and employment programs for refugees in coordination
with NGOs for service provision and information-gathering would represent a massive step
toward securing a comprehensive framework of rights for asylum seekers and refugees within
the country. It would also allow Hungary to take part in the EU refugee resettlement program, as
Hungary currently holds a proportionally smaller population of migrants than nearly any other
country in the EU.
On a final note, it is important to mention that this thesis’ recommendations for
Hungary’s refugee policy are broad and drastic because what the country needs to fulfill its
internationally guaranteed promises are massive changes in policy, program, and perspective. At
the moment, Hungary possesses more anti-refugee policy than refugee policy. In reality, it is
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unlikely that Hungary will change its refugee policies to be less restrictive under the leadership
of Viktor Orbán without harsh punitive action toward Hungary on a global scale. Still, Hungary
is just merely of many countries currently refusing to fulfill their responsibilities to those
escaping persecution and more urgent measures need to be taken toward these countries if the
global community is to solve the refugee crisis.
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The Americas

While the previous countries discussed in this thesis serve as some of the global hotspots
for asylum seeker entry in the 21st century, the Americas are an ocean away from the Syrian
refugee crisis. While the Americas have certainly produced refugees of their own through gang
violence in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala or the Venezuelan refugee crisis, countries in
the Americas that were willing to host refugees have predominantly focused their efforts on
refugee resettlement rather than asylum. The most prolific refugee resettlement policies in the
Americas have come from the United States of America and Canada, where each possess
uniquely different legacies and approaches to hosting. While “the United States has historically
led the world in terms of formal refugee resettlement”, the rise of the Trump administration has
led to significant cutbacks on refugee admissions and refugee program budgets across the
country.292 Canada, on the other hand, has rapidly transformed from a modest actor in the world
of refugee resettlement to a global leader in the field under the administration of Trudeau,
resettling more refugees than any other country in 2018.293
The United States and Canada both possess deep refugee backgrounds. Both countries
began as colonial territories of different countries, and while Spanish and French colonists came
for exploration and resources, “much of the initial migration to the North American English
colonies was primarily refugees fleeing oppression and persecution.”294 Therefore, much of
North America has inherited legacies of refugees who have travelled thousands of miles and
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made the continent their permanent home. This distance from home could explain why North
American refugee policy tends to concentrate more toward integration rather than repatriation.
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The United States of America.
The United States of America represents the quintessential migrant country. It was
founded by refugees and grew through diverse flows of migrants over time. To this day, the
United States retains programs for refugee resettlement based on a refugee admissions ceiling as
well as asylee protection through asylum applications. Based on 2020 data from the Refugee
Processing Center of the US Department of State, the United States has resettled 3,449, 967
refugees since 1975.295 In 2018, “the leading countries of nationality for individuals admitted as
refugees were the Democratic Republic of the Congo (35 percent), Burma (16 percent), Ukraine
(12 percent), Bhutan (10 percent), and Eritrea (six percent).”296 Traditionally, the United States
has resettled more refugees than it has admitted asylees. From 1980 until 2005, the United States
accepted more than 50,000 refugees per year (sometimes over 100,000), while the number of
asylum seekers gaining asylum in the country never exceeded 40,000.297 However, under the
Trump administration, the United States refugee resettlement program experienced massive cuts
to the refugee admissions ceiling while asylee admissions have remained relatively constant. In
2018, the number of individuals granted asylum surpassed the number of resettled refugees for
the first time, with 38,687 asylees compared to 22,405 refugees (with a ceiling of 45,000).298 As
asylee acceptance and registration remains relatively constant, the United States government has
gradually reduced their refugee resettlement program, which used to be the most comprehensive
in the world.
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While the United States was founded in part by Separatist Pilgrims who had fled religious
persecution by the Church of England, the term “refugee” was not coined until centuries later. In
the first 100 years of the country’s founding, immigration to the United States “remained
practically unrestricted” so there was no distinction to be made between categories of protected
status.299 But in the 1880s, Congress created measures to deter some kinds of immigrants and
created a protected status category “for those seeking admission ‘to avoid persecution or
punishment on religious or political grounds.’”300 The first few decades of this newly protected
status applied to Jews fleeing Europe. According to Ben Saxon’s A History of Jews,
approximately 2 million Jews reached the United States between 1881 and 1914 under this
protected category. However, other immigrants to the United States began to experience the
country’s first immigration restrictions as the country set quotas to admissions by country for
those who didn’t fit into the protected category, particularly those in the Eastern Hemisphere.
With the onset of the Great Depression, quotas for immigration into the United States continued
to become more strict, with economic requirements for admission coming into law.301
After the Second World War, the United States began to formulate its own measures to
host newly displaced Europeans, despite keeping its doors closed through the war. In 1948,
Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act (DPA) “to assist in the European reconstruction
effort by allowing refugees to resettle in the U.S.”302 400,000 displaced persons entered the
United States through the DPA even though the country counted admissions against the national
origin immigration quota.303 The United States also refused to sign the 1951 Refugee Convention
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after its creation as President Truman felt that the DPA was sufficient to respond to the European
refugee crisis. Instead, Congress continued to respond to refugee resettlement through ad-hoc
measures such as the 1953 Refugee Relief Act, the 1957 Refugee-Escapee Act, and the 1958
Hungarian Refugee Act. The Refugee Relief Act pertained to remaining refugees after the
Second World War and the other two acts were in response to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, as
Americans found the fight against communism to be a sufficiently compelling reason to provide
shelter for persecuted individuals; these bills allowed approximately 250,000 refugees to enter
the United States.304
Fleeing communism proved to be a compelling reason not only for refugee resettlement
but also for asylum in the United States. From 1959 until 1962, 200,000 Cuban asylum seekers
fled to the United States after the Cuban Revolution.305 The United States saw this wave as a
Cold War victory and utilized a somewhat informal “passive admissions policy” to accept them.
In 1965, Congress realized the impractical nature of accepting refugees on an ad-hoc basis and
passed the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The act “eliminated national origin quotas
and developed a preference system for the admission of immigrants”, with refugees to be
admitted as 6% of annual migrants to the country.306 Nevertheless, the United States still only
defined “refugees” as those fleeing Communist countries or persecution in the Middle East.
In 1968, the United States signed on to the 1967 Refugee Protocol. By signing the
Protocol, countries implicitly agree to the rights and definitions guaranteed in the 1951 Refugee
Convention, so the United States agreed to those terms in theory as well. However, the United
States continued to deny asylum for those fleeing “friendly regimes”, which included Greeks
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escaping the far-right wing military coup of 1967 and Chileans fleeing Pinochet’s regime.307
Nonetheless, the United States still allowed massive influxes of refugees from non-friendly
nations. In 1977 and 1978, Congress passed two acts to increase the number of refugees allowed
into the country as a result of the Vietnam War.308 The United States resettled nearly 300,000
Vietnamese refugees from refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia from
1978-1982.309 Despite not technically adhering to the UN definition of a refugee, the United
States still played a massive role in easing the Indochinese crisis and contributing to an equitable
international system of refugee hosting.
With the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress finally matched the US refugee definition to that
of the UN. The Refugee Act of 1980 represented a massive change in refugee resettlement policy
for the United States. The act raised the ceiling for refugee admission, stopped counting refugee
admissions against the general immigration quota, created a “system for the orderly adjudication
of asylum claims”, established the refugee resettlement program and its service provision, and
allowed the President to determine the annual quota of refugees (under the review of
Congress).310 For 1980, the United States set the refugee ceiling at 232,000 and resettled 207,000
refugees.311 This act was the piece of legislation that transformed the United States from a
country of migrants to the most prominent place for refugee resettlement in the world. The
following graph shows the refugee ceiling and resettlement of the United States between 1980
and 2019:
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312

However, the United States was criticized thereafter for discriminating against refugees
and asylum seekers by country of origin. Reportedly, refugees from communist-controlled
countries were given priority over others, particularly those from Eastern Europe and parts of
Asia.313 To further reinforce this standard, the federal government enacted the Lautenberg
Amendment as part of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act to reduce the bar of evidence
to acquire refugee status for Indochinese and former Soviet refugees.314 Nationality-based bias
applied to asylum seekers as well. Asylum seekers from Cuba and Nicaragua experienced high
rates of asylum grants in the United States during the 1980s, but asylum seekers from El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti were routinely denied entry into the country, sometimes without
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Figure 6. This image comes from a graph by Brittany Blizzard and Jeanne Batalova in the Migration
Policy Institute describing the refugee resettlement ceiling and number of refugees admitted by the United States
between the fiscal years of 1980 until 2019, using US Department of State data. Image from
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-and-asylees-united-states.
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being granted access to formal asylum procedures.315 While the United States may have adopted
the UN refugee definition in theory, the country held on to its biases against admitting refugees
or asylum seekers from “friendly” nations during the Cold War. Preferring certain countries for
refugee resettlement may be discriminatory, but denying asylum seekers the ability to fair
hearings and resorting to immediate deportation represents a clear violation of the principle of
non-refoulement. After the Cold War, American preferential treatment toward refugees fleeing
Communist countries appeared to subside, but Congress continued to tighten policy toward
asylum seekers.
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA), which held multiple clauses targeted toward asylum. The act required that asylum
seekers submit applications for asylum in the United States within one year of entry, gave
immigration officers the power to deport asylum seekers upon entry, and demanded the detention
of asylum seekers be detained while their cases are under review.316 The IIRIRA made it
significantly easier for the United States to violate the principle of non-refoulement, even if it did
not directly violate the rights of asylum seekers.
For the next 20 years after the IIRIRA, the American refugee program remained
relatively stable, aside from some small changes. After the Cold War, the United States raised
the annual refugee admission ceiling back above 100,000 per year, which slowly decreased back
to approximately 70,000 in 1997.317 The refugee quota in the United States stayed approximately
the same between 2000 and 2015, but the number of refugee arrivals experienced a significant
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drop in 2002 and 2003.318 Understandably, this drop occurred immediately after 9/11, when
President Bush suspended refugee admissions for a few months. As anti-immigrant and antiMuslim sentiment reached a peak in the United States, the numbers for resettlement remained far
away from the admissions ceiling until public sentiment returned to relative stability. Still, the
United States remained favorable to non-Muslim refugees as the federal government passed the
“Specter Amendment” to the Lautenberg Amendment in 2004, which lowered the evidence
required for the refugee resettlement of Iranian religious minorities, escaping persecution on the
basis of religion.319
With the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis, the Obama administration chose to increase
the refugee admissions ceiling to 85,000 and accepted 84,994 refugees in 2016.320 For the 2017
fiscal year, the Obama administration had planned to raise the admissions ceiling to 115,000 in
order to fulfill the United States’ obligations for international burden-sharing, but in its first year,
the Trump administration cut the admissions ceiling to 50,000, the lowest it had been since the
institution of the Refugee Act of 1980.321 Simultaneously, President Trump signed an executive
order to suspend the US refugee admission program for 120 days, with an additional 90 day
travel ban (coined the “Muslim ban”) applying to seven Muslim majority countries, namely Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. 322This ban had long-term impacts on the United
States’ refugee resettlement program, as the Trump administration continued to reduce the
admissions ceiling to 45,000 in 2018, 30,000 in 2019, and only 18,000 in 2020. The xenophobic
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rhetoric of these laws appeared to work to deter Muslim refugee acceptance in the United States,
as the percentage of refugee resettlement by religion of Muslims shrank from 44% in 2016 and
47% in 2017 to 16% in 2018 and 2019.323 Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security
began “implementing program enhancements to raise the bar for vetting and screening
procedures” for refugees in 2017, increasing the already-lengthy 18-24 month processing time
for refugee resettlement even further.324 Decreasing the refugee resettlement quota and making
the refugee vetting process more arduous has also led to the destruction of many refugee
resettlement programs, which now struggle from a lack of budget and new attendance. Therefore,
the Trump administration has directly placed barriers upon what was once the most robust
refugee resettlement program in the world.
As to persons trying to seek protection once in the US (as compared to refugee
resettlement), in lieu of being able to adjust quotas, the Trump administration has hampered
asylum seeker applications through a new series of measures over the last three years. The theory
behind these measures is that they would act as a deterrent for people trying to seek asylum. The
federal administration instituted a policy of child separation from their families for asylum
seekers at the US-Mexican border from April 2018 until June of 2018; while this policy was
discontinued after two months due to widespread unpopularity, reports indicate that family
separation may have continued unofficially long after the fact.325 According to Amnesty
International, the agency for Customs and Border Protection “has implemented an illegal de
facto policy of pushbacks of asylum-seekers along the entire US–Mexico border at official US
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border crossings” and implemented a policy of indefinite detainment for asylum seekers who do
make it to the border.326 Also, former United States Attorney General Jeff Sessions tried to limit
the grounds by which asylum seekers could gain asylum in the United States in 2018 by telling
U.S. immigration courts to stop granting asylum on the basis of domestic abuse and gang
violence. Finally, the Trump administration passed the Migrant Protection Protocols which
“allows US border officers to return non-Mexican asylum seekers to dangerous locations in
Mexico as their claims are adjudicated in US immigration courts” on the basis of section 235 (b)
(2) (c) of the INA that allows the Department of Homeland Security to return some asylum
applicants to a contiguous country from which they are arriving.327 The legality of many of these
policies, directives, and measures is under litigation as of the writing of this thesis by
organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union, but they continue to exist as part of
American asylum policy to this day.
Within the United States, “arriving refugees are placed in communities based on their
needs, factors including family ties, and the receiving community’s language services, health
care and housing availability, educational and job opportunities, and cost of living.”328 Typically,
either the UNHCR, an embassy, or an NGO refers refugees for resettlement to the United States,
who are then placed into a given state by the Department of State’s Reception and Placement
Program (R&P).329 R&P provides initial refugee assistance in the United States, while the Office
of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) provides long-term funding for refugee assistance. This funding
goes to state and local government departments along with nonprofit resettlement agencies, that
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then create programs and policies for refugees in each individual state. As such, the federal
government only tracks the initial resettlement of refugees because after their first placement,
refugees have the right to freedom of movement anywhere in the country and within one year of
arrival, they must apply for permanent residency. Therefore, the federal government in the
United States determines the placement and funding given to refugees and attempts to maintain
an equitable distribution of refugees around the country for their initial placement. The following
is a map of initial refugee placement in the United States by state in 2019:
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Figure 7. This map comes from statistical data sourced by the author from the Refugee Processing
Center regarding refugee resettlement in the United States in 2019. Data from https://ireports.wrapsnet.org/.
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The stated goals of the American refugee resettlement program, founded in 1980, are to
“to provide a uniform procedure for refugee admissions” and “to authorize federal assistance to
resettle refugees and promote their self-sufficiency.”331 By law, the United States has agreed to
the UN definition of a refugee and the rights afforded to them. For processing refugees, the
United States has instituted another set of criteria: a refugee priority system for admission.
Priority 1 refugees are those for whom resettlement is an appropriate durable solution and must
be referred by the UNHCR, an embassy, or an NGO.332 Priority 2 refugees are those protected by
the Lautenberg Amendment or the Specter Amendment, meaning that these refugees are of
“special humanitarian concern” for the United States and don’t require special referral.333
Priority 3 involves refugee family reunification to be filed by an eligible relative in the United
States.334 Priority 3 refugees do not require special referral, but Priority 3 processing is limited to
either refugees from one of 15 countries or admitted asylees.335 Nevertheless, all have to first
meet the definition of refugee, then be given priority based on their particular circumstance.
After the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) in the Department of
State identifies a refugee under one of these categories, the Department of Homeland Security’s
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) agency adjudicates refugee cases. While
USCIS conducts refugee background checks and collects biographical information, the
Department of Health and Human Services is responsible for checking refugee admissibility on
the basis of communicable diseases pertaining to public health.336 These screenings take place in
Refugee Support Centers (RSCs) abroad. As mentioned previously, American processing of
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refugee resettlement typically takes 18-24 months and ostensibly takes even longer after the
federal government further increased the security screening process in 2017.337 Refugees also
must cover their travel expenses for resettlement by obtaining an interest-free travel loan to cover
their travel costs that must be paid back within six months of arrival in the United States.338
Before refugees leave for the United States, they receive a few days of cultural orientation to
prepare themselves for life in their new homes.
When refugees arrive into the United States, they are offered a number of forms of cash
assistance and benefits to provide for their eventual economic self-sufficiency. For the first 30
days after arrival in the United States, the Reception and Placement Program pays nine nongovernmental voluntary organizations (VOLAGs) to provide food, clothing, housing, educational
enrollment for children, language classes, employment assistance, and assist with social security
card applications.339 This means that refugees have their housing opportunities provided for them
upon arrival through VOLAGs, gaining housing in either existing housing, available public
housing, hosting from non-profit refugee NGOs, or settlement with existing family in the
country.
After that point, the United States offers Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) grants for low-incoming individuals with small children for up to five years and
Medicaid for low-income individuals for up to seven years.340 The federal government also
supplies Supplemental Security Income (SSI) to aged, blind, or disabled individuals for up to
seven years and the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) for food assistance to
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low-income individuals indefinitely.341 For refugees who do not qualify for TANF grants or
Medicaid, the Office of Refugee Resettlement offers Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) and
Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA) for up to eight months. All of this service provision appears
robust, but individual departments or NGOs responsible for refugee issues in each state control
how much financial assistance comes with these grants, with states like California and New York
offering TANF grants three times higher than Texas and Florida, higher SSI benefits, and
Medicaid income thresholds compared to poverty level five to ten times higher.342 As such, equal
service provision to refugees across states remains relatively uneven in the country.
When refugees in each state do not have access to financial support and programs as
refugees in other states, this leads to waves of secondary migration. For example, Haitian
refugees in California might move to Massachusetts if they realize that they would receive better
access to programs and community support in a different state. In 2012 and 2013, Minnesota
received 4000 refugees instead of the original 2000 that it had planned to resettle due to
secondary migration.343 Secondary migration can lead to an unequitable distribution of refugees
around the United States, placing excess responsibility on certain states as a direct result of
uneven service provision and program administration.
Refugees in the United States tend not to stay as refugees for long, as the country
maintains relatively expedient pathways to lawful permanent residency and later, if they choose,
to naturalization. After living in the country for one year, refugee are eligible to apply for
permanent resident status after one year and are required to do so.344 Once a refugee has been a
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lawful permanent resident for five years, they become eligible to apply for American citizenship.
By requiring that refugees apply for permanent residence after one year, the United States is
ensuring that not many refugees exist in the ORR system for long, allowing the country to take in
a high annual number of refugees. Furthermore, this displays a national willingness to allow
refugees to integrate into American society because resettled refugees who have moved overseas
are generally unlikely to experience voluntary repatriation to their countries of origin.
Refugees in the United States possess the right to primary and secondary education, with
universities and NGOs offering grants and increased opportunities for tertiary education as well.
While Refugee Medical Assistance and Refugee Cash Assistance make up the majority of
federal funding for refugee programs, state agencies, local agencies, and NGOs are in charge of
applying for federal funding for educational and language-based programs for refugees, which
may or may not be granted due to budgetary constraints and past program success. One negative
consequence of this subjective funding is that refugees possess widely different educational
levels between states and significantly different levels of English Language Proficiency. For
example, the Migration Policy Institute has found that percentages of refugees holding
Bachelor’s Degrees or speaking English proficiently can vary up to 50% between states and over
20% within the same nationality.345 Refugees might receive access to appropriate rights and
benefits, but these advantages do not remain equal for refugees in all geographic locations within
the country.
The United States refugee resettlement program not only grants refugees the right to
work, but considers it a priority. Approximately half of refugees in resettlement assistance
programs find employment within eight months and three quarters of them retain those jobs for
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over 90 days.346 In fact, the Center for Migration Studies (CMS) took a sample of 1.1 million
refugees in the United States in a 2016 study, which determined that “the labor force
participation and employment rates of the 1.1 million refugees in CMS’s sample exceed those of
the overall US population.”347 This is a massive success for the economic participation of
refugees, but the work focused approach of the resettlement program carries certain
disadvantages as well. Refugees in the United States have a higher rate of employment than that
of native born Americans, but they also possess a higher rate of underemployment, meaning they
had a proportionally higher number of individuals with tertiary education performing low-skilled
labor.348 Therefore, a focus on “employment-first” in the refugee resettlement program rather
than appropriate vocational training and English language training can limit the future career
prospects, language acquisition, and educational goals of refugees. For instance, the “ORR
requires refugees to be employed while receiving additional skills training, and limits this
training to a year, even though recertification can often take several years to complete.”349
Unsurprisingly, studies have found that refugees integrate to the United States to a greater
degree the longer that they stay in the country. Individual state agencies such as the
Massachusetts Office for Refugees and Immigrants (ORI) have tried to ease the integration
process by offering additional programs for refugees that have seen great success in recent years,
such as the Financial Literacy for Newcomers Program (FLNP), the Citizenship for New
Americans Program (CNAP), and the English Language Training Program (ELT). However,
many other states cannot promise neither these same services to refugees, nor the same funding.
The Migration Policy Institute has reported that since 2015, “states and localities have become

Fix, Hooper, and Zong, “How Are Refugees Faring?”, 1.
Kerwin, “The US Refugee Resettlement Program,” 206.
348
Fix, Hooper, and Zong, “How Are Refugees Faring?”, 2.
349
Ibid, 16.
346
347

Identifying Better Refugee Policies

Rook 118

increasingly vocal about having greater say so in the resettlement process, and a number have
ended state involvement in the provision of refugee services, leaving them to local
nongovernmental resettlement agencies.”350 As a result, the refugee resettlement program relies
heavily on the contributions of public-private partnerships with voluntary resettlement agencies,
particularly Catholic charities, for both initial support of refugees and subsequent administration
of integration services.
The U.S. Refugee Admission Program (USRAP) is a massive and comprehensive system
in which multiple agencies in international organizations, federal governments, state and local
governments, NGOs, and other voluntary resettlement agencies intertwine to provide
resettlement and services for refugees. However, the intricacy and bureaucracy of this
communication results in long chains of communication between the different layers of agencies.
For example, Mary Truong, ORI Executive Director, mentions that the process from assigning
refugee numbers to adjusting program funding requires communication between the PRM and
VOLAGs to determine initial accommodation numbers, which are then approved by the ORI,
who sends that information back to the PRM, which communicates with the ORR to process and
approve that number to send an initial budget back to the ORI according to the number of
incoming working adults and the number of refugees served in the prior year. Executive Director
Truong mentions that the ORR does a good job of accommodating budget requests and
adjustments, though the Office still relies on the federal government for overall funding. In
recent years, the ORI has begun to utilize private funding from donors to administer more
comprehensive programs such as the Financial Literacy for Newcomers Program, in lieu of
additional federal funding.
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Additionally, refugee resettlement in the United States has suffered from its recent
federal administration. By cutting the refugee admissions ceiling to one tenth of Fiscal Year
2017 quota in 2020, the Trump administration has successfully created a vicious cycle in the
country that destroy existing state refugee integration program. When the United States cuts the
admissions ceiling for refugees, fewer incoming refugees are able to attend existing programs in
the United States. When the federal government sees that attendance is low for existing
integration programs, the ORR reduces the budget allowed for those state programs, cancels
other integration programs, and lays off excess staff within state-based agencies. This cycle
continues every time the refugee admissions ceiling is cut from year to year.
The Trump administration has also tried to eliminate asylum seeker entry by land. The
United States currently has a “safe third country agreement” with Canada. A “safe third country
agreement means that one nation can return asylum seekers to another if “either the third country
that the refugee traveled through was a ‘safe third country,’ and therefore the person should have
applied for asylum there, or the third country already granted the person protection and was
therefore in effect the ‘first country of asylum.’”351 In 2019 and 2020, the Trump administration
has tried to sign these agreements with Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.352353 If
these agreements are ratified by these countries, asylum seekers may not pass through them to
apply for asylum in the United States and if Mexico signs it, the United States would have safe
third country agreements on both of its land borders. With the onset of the coronavirus in 2020,
the Trump administration has also denied all asylum seekers entering the southwest border of the
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nation to prevent the spread of the pandemic and placed a halt on refugee resettlement.354 It
remains to be determined whether the current federal government will lift this ban as the
pandemic passes, or make these restrictions a feature of American refugee and asylee policy.
Here is the United States’ relevant signed international legislation on refugees and asylum
seekers to date:
Legislation Year
Implemented
1948
1953

1957/58

1965

1968
1977/78
1980

1990

1996

2004

2017

Legislation Name

Description of Legislation

Passage of the Displaced
Persons Act
Passage of the Refugee
Relief Act

Facilitated the resettlement of post-World
War 2 refugees to the United States
Facilitated the resettlement of remaining
post-World War 2 refugees to the United
States
Passage of the RefugeeEnabled the mass-resettlement of
Escapee Act and the
Hungarian refugees after the 1956
Hungarian Refugee Act
Hungarian Revolution
Implementation of the
Eliminated national origin quotas for
Immigration and Nationality immigrants and instituted regular refugee
Act
resettlement
Ratification of the 1967
Aligned the US refugee definition with
Refugee Protocol
international rights and terms (in theory)
Suspension of the INA
Allowed for the resettlement of
admissions cap
Vietnamese refugees
Passage of the Refugee Act Adjusted the US refugee definition to
international guidelines and instituted the
American refugee resettlement program
Enactment of the
Reduced the bar of evidence to refugee
Lautenberg Amendment
status for Indochinese and former Soviet
refugees
Passage of the Illegal
Tightened restrictions on applications for
Immigration Reform and
asylum and strengthened the power of
Immigrant Responsibility
immigration officers, and mandated
Act
asylum seeker detainment
Enactment of the Specter
Reduced the bar of evidence to refugee
Amendment
status for Iranian refugees from a religious
minority
Strengthening of Refugee
Increased DHS screening procedures for
Vetting Procedures and
refugees

Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Michael D. Shear, and Maggie Haberman, “Citing Coronavirus, Trump Will
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Passage of the Travel Ban

2018

Implementation of the
Family Separation Policy
Passage of the Migrant
Protection Protocols
Emergency suspension of
US southwestern bordercrossing

2019
2020
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Suspended the refugee resettlement
program for 120 days, with an additional
90 day travel ban for 11 countries
Legalized the separation of children from
parents at the southern US border
Allowed for the deportation of nonMexican asylum seekers to Mexico
Denied all immigration to the US from the
southwest indefinitely due to pandemic
protocols

The United States used to be the primary refugee resettlement country in the world, but
recent restrictions in programs, policy, and admissions for refugees and asylum seekers have
stripped that status from them. The country has also ratified the 1967 Refugee Protocol, meaning
that they have agreed to the rights afforded to refugees that were decreed by the 1951 Refugee
Convention. Primarily through recent policies, the government of the United States has violated
Articles 3 and 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Article 3 is the non-discrimination clause,
stating that ratifying states “shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without
discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.” Article 33 is the non-refoulement clause,
which states that no ratifying state “shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” The United
States has violated Article 3 by instituting a travel ban for refugees from Muslim-majority
countries, expressing preferential treatment for refugees from specific religious minorities
through the Lautenberg and Specter Amendments, and by increasing screening procedures for
refugees from 11 “high-risk countries.”355 The United States has violated Article 33 by forcefully
deporting non-Mexican asylum seekers to Mexico and allowing immigration officers to deport
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asylum seekers at ports of entry without a fair hearing. Other concerns about the American
refugee resettlement program include massive reductions in the refugee admission ceiling, lack
of access to appropriate vocational training, and poor communication between actors in the
refugee resettlement program. On the basis of these concerns, this thesis presents the following
recommendations for refugee policy and programs in the United States of America:
First, the United States must repeal its 2017 screening restrictions for refugee
resettlement from “high-risk” countries. The American refugee vetting process already takes 1824 months on average and the country must place more trust in its Department of State to
appropriately assess refugees without discriminating against Muslim-majority countries through
additional deterrents.
Second, President of the United States ought to raise the admissions ceiling for refugee
resettlement to that of the pre-Trump era (80,000+ per fiscal year) and adjust federal parameters
for determining the ceiling. The country needs to take into account its own hosting capacity
based on NGO support and program availability, while remaining mindful of refugee crises
around the world to perform its role in international burden-sharing.
Third, the United States government must repeal the 1990 Lautenberg Amendment along
with the 2004 Specter Amendment. These pieces of legislation are antiquated and give
preference to “special interest groups” that no longer require lowered barriers to resettlement. If
the government wishes to provide additional exemptions to resettle refugees, it can do so in the
case of a new refugee crisis or massive destabilization when large numbers of refugees need to
be resettled in a short period of time as an exercise of international burden-sharing.
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Fourth, the United States government must refrain from instituting additional
discriminatory travel bans, like the “Muslim ban”, as these represent a violation of freedom from
discrimination and breed xenophobic rhetoric within the country.
Fifth, the United States must amend the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act to remove the power of deportation from immigration officers and ensure that
asylum seekers receive a fair trial in the United States.
Sixth, the United States must repeal the Migrant Protection Protocols and refrain from
deporting asylum seekers to Mexico as they await asylum processing in the United States. Doing
so places them in unnecessary danger and violates non-refoulement. The United States does not
have a safe third country agreement with Mexico and must respect the rights of asylum seekers.
Seventh, the United States must pass a law that formally prevents family separation at the
border and unnecessarily endangering the lives of child asylum-seekers.
Eighth, either the Department of State’s Resettlement and Placement program should
contribute more funding to VOLAGs in order to provide integration services for refugees beyond
the initial 30 day period or the ORR should to increase funding to state refugee departments to
ensure that they can effectively run their refugee programs. 30 days of comprehensive service
provision is not enough to allow refugees to integrate to the United States and state refugee
programs do not currently possess the funding to provide comprehensive services to refugees for
the subsequent 11 months.
Ninth, the ORR ought to remove employment as a requirement for refugees to receive
additional skills training and the agency must fund the entirety of vocational training programs.
One of the stated goals of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to provide for the self-sufficiency of
refugees and they cannot do that if they are not afforded opportunities for career advancement.
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Finally, the United States should standardize refugee program provision across the states
to ensure that refugees receive equal services regardless of where they live. Certain programs,
like employment, citizenship, vocational training, English language training, and financial
literacy are vital to integration. Still, the ORR ought to allow state refugee departments and
NGOs to propose additional integration programs in order to inspire growth in the refugee
resettlement program and include successful programs as part of the national integration service
provision.
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Canada.
Unlike the other countries examined in this thesis, Canada has always prioritized refugee
resettlement over programs for asylum. While Canada routinely takes in less than 15,000 asylees
per year,356 the country has resettled more than 20,000 refugees every year since the late
1980s.357 Because Canada’s only land-bordering country is the US, with which Canada has a
“safe third country agreement”, resettlement became a more effective method of refugee hosting.
Since 1980, “Canada has welcomed 1,088,015 refugees” and as of 2018 the country resettles
more refugees per year in total and per capita than any other country in the world.358 In 2018,
Canada resettled 28,076 refugees, with over half of them coming from the Middle East.359 While
some people may attribute this acceptance of refugees to a federal sense of cultural openness, the
country is also unique with regard to its refugee policy due to private refugee sponsorship. In
addition to a Government-Assisted Refugees program (GAR), Canada has created a Privately
Sponsored Refugee program (PSR), which makes private individuals “responsible for receiving,
orienting, and supporting refugees at all stages of resettlement process.”360 The PSR allows
citizens to determine refugee resettlement numbers each year through the local population’s
willingness and capacity to host; in fact, the PSR resettled two-thirds of Canada’s 28,076
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refugees in 2018.361 However, Canada’s private refugee hosting is relatively new and the country
took a long time to build up a willingness for international responsibility sharing.
Canada was founded through the union of four established French-British colonies under
the rule of the United Kingdom in 1867. Unlike the Pilgrims, these colonists did not share the
same refugee roots as the founders of the United States, but the country retained relatively open
immigration before and after its foundation. Before 1860, an estimated 30,000 African-American
refugees sought sanctuary in Canada as the final stop on the Underground Railroad.362 In the
decades after that, Canada continued to accept Jews and Doukhobors fleeing Tsarist Russia due
to religious persecution.363 Therefore, Canada remained a relatively open environment to
newcomers immediately before and after its foundation.
With regard to legislation, Canada passed its first Immigration Act in 1869. The act
contained no clauses for refugees and remained primarily focused on providing safe travel for
immigrants to Canada.364 Soon thereafter, Canada began to close its doors to specific populations
of migrants with the Chinese Immigration Act of 1885. This act attempted to exclude Chinese
migrants by imposing a duty of $50 on each Chinese person entering the country.365 Canada
continued to increase the duty to $100 per person in 1900 and $500 per person in 1903. Canada
continued to reinforce this sentiment with the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923, which
effectively limited Chinese immigration to “diplomats and government representatives,
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merchants, children born in Canada who had left for educational or other purposes, and students
while attending university or college.”366
The country also expanded immigration-based restrictions beyond merely Chinese people
with a slew of immigration acts. The 1906 Immigration Act formalized deportation and allowed
the government to prohibit any class of immigrants when if was deemed necessary. The 1910
Immigration Act “expanded the list of prohibited immigrants and gave the government greater
discretionary authority concerning the admissibility and deportation of immigrants” if they were
considered “unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada.”367 Furthermore, the Canadian
government amended the Immigration Act in 1919 to deny immigrants from enemy countries,
political dissidents, and any immigrant’s “peculiar customs, habits, modes of life and methods of
holding property.”368 In fact, Canada opposed hosting displaced persons after the First World
War entirely. The early 20th century in Canada was characterized by waves of anti-immigrant
sentiment shown not only by public opinion, but also all of this legislation, despite Canada’s
immigrant legacies. According to the Canadian Encyclopedia, “Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism
permeated Canada, and there was little public support for, and much opposition to, the admission
of refugees… until after the Second World War.”369
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Canadian xenophobia continued to dominate the
national perspective. In the 1930s, Canada began to deport unemployed persons, labor activists,
and suspected Communists in the wake of the “Red Scare” after the First World War.370 AntiSemitism peaked in 1939 in Canada as the country denied 930 Jewish refugees on the SS St.
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Louis seeking asylum on the basis of religious persecution as they fled Nazi Germany.371 These
refugees were sent back to Germany to face certain death. Canada admitted only 5,000 Jewish
refugees during the Second World War and when immigration officials were asked how many
Jews the country would admit after the war, their famous response was, “None is too many.”372
After the Second World War, the Canadian government began to receive more pressure
both domestically and internationally to fulfill their humanitarian responsibility of hosting
displaced persons. In 1946, the Canadian government signed an Order-in-Council that allowed
Canadians to sponsor displaced family members in Europe seeking refuge after the war and
allow them into the country.373 In 1947, Canada began to enact additional ad-hoc agreements in
to allow displaced persons to enter the country (much like the United States) in what was called
the Displaced Persons movement, which successfully resettled 186,154 refugees to Canada over
the course of six years.374 The country continued to open access to the country through the
Assisted Passage Loan Agreement in 1951, which gave loans to European migrants who could
not pay off their travel to Canada to be paid back over the course of two years. These measures
were certainly an improvement in Canadian refugee acceptance, but the Canadian Council for
Refugees notes that during the Displaced Persons movement, the Canadian government tended to
accept refugees based on “economic self-interest, racial prejudice and political bias”, not
humanitarian reasons.375 Canada’s prejudicial process was revealed when the country chose not
to sign the 1951 Refugee Convention. Ministers in the country were reportedly concerned that
signing the Convention would outlaw the deportation of potentially dangerous refugees and give
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them additional rights beyond those granted by the Canadian government.376 After that point,
Canada continued to allow European refugee entry on an ad-hoc basis.
In 1952, Canada passed a new Immigration Act that gave the government and the
governor-in-council more agency over the admission and deportation of all migrants, allowing
the government to keep as much control over migrant flows as possible. While Canada’s
immigration policy remained restrictive to non-European foreigners, Canada continued to
resettle European refugees. Canada admitted 37,000 Hungarian refugees after the Hungarian
Revolution in 1956 as well as 10,975 Czech refugees after the Prague Spring in 1968.377 Despite
continuing xenophobic policies, the Canadian government remained resentful of Communism
and accepted refugees fleeing Soviet oppression (much like the United States of America).
However, Canada’s racially biased stance on refugees finally began to change with the
introduction of Order-in-Council PC 1962-86. This order eliminated race as a determinant of
migrant acceptance and touted “skill” as the primary component for admissibility; nevertheless,
“only Canadian immigrants from preferred nations in Europe, the Americas and select countries
in the Middle East were permitted to sponsor children over the age of 21, married children and
other members of their extended family.”378 In 1969, Canada ratified the 1951 Refugee
Convention as well as the 1967 Refugee Protocol, but had yet to incorporate refugee rights and
admissions into its national law. Instead, Canada issued a “Guideline for Determination of
Refugee Status” in 1970 to give immigration officers criteria for selecting refugees overseas. 379
Around the same time, Canada accepted its first non-European refugees by resettling a group of
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228 Tibetan refugees and developing a “Tibetan Refugee Program” to host them.380 Tibetan
Refugee Hosting opened the doorway to other refugee resettlement, as Canada hosted about
7,000 ethnic South Asians expelled from Uganda under the dictatorship of Idi Amin in 1972,
7,000 Chilean refugees fleeing Pinochet’s regime in 1973, and about 10,000 Lebanese refugees
fleeing the Lebanese Civil War between 1975 and 1978.381 This new trend of refugee hosting
efforts appeared to quell Canadian xenophobic sentiment and gave rise to realization that a more
comprehensive system for refugee resettlement might be necessary.
In 1976, Canada passed its most significant Immigration Act to date. The Act officially
matched the Canadian refugee definition to that of the UN Convention and allowed the
government to set refugee quotas each year.382 Furthermore, the 1976 Immigration Act created
Canada’s Refugee Status Advisory Committee and divided refugee resettlement into two
categories: government sponsorship and private sponsorship. Later on, Canada would also
implement shared government-private sponsorship programs. The Private Sponsorship of
Refugees Program (PSRP) began in 1979, after its incorporation into the 1976 Immigration Act”,
which allowed individuals as well as organizations to resettle and integrate refugees, provided
that they host them for one year.383 The new Immigration Act and Private Sponsorship Program
were immediately put into use to resettle refugees after the Vietnam War. Canada’s refugee
intake was relatively low after the formation of its resettlement program, but the Vietnam war
caused the Canadian government to rapidly extend its government-assisted refugee quota far
beyond its allocation of 8,000 southeast Asian refugees in an attempt to match the country’s
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private sponsorship. Over the next two years, Canada resettled 77,000 refugees from Southeast
Asia, making up 25% of Canada’s total immigration during that time.384
After Canada has secured systems and rights for refugee resettlement, the country also
developed its framework for asylum seekers with the creation of the Immigration and Refugee
Board of Canada (IRB). Established in 1985 and implemented in 1989, the IRB established that
refugee claimants “are entitled to fundamental justice under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms”, as decreed by the Supreme Court of Canada.385 Canada now began to receive
thousands of refugee claimants per year in addition to the tens of thousands of refugees that it
would resettle. In 1986, the country also received the UNHCR’s first ever Nansen Medal given
to a “people” instead of an individual for the country’s contributions to refugee resettlement.
Additionally, Canada also became the first country in the world to pass a national
multiculturalism act with the Canadian Multiculturalism Act in 1988, which “sought to protect
the cultural heritage of all Canadians, reduce discrimination and encourage the implementation
of multicultural programs and initiatives within institutions and organizations.”386 Over a period
of 15 years, Canada had gone from a relatively xenophobic nation with a shoddy framework for
refugee policy to one of the world’s global leaders in the field.
However, Canada paired its new asylum seeker framework with a number of legal
restrictions on asylum seeker entry as a result of the country’s economic recession. In 1988,
Canada passed Bill C-84, which “introduced new ‘detention and deterrence’ measures, among
them tougher criminal penalties on those who ‘smuggled’ or aided the undocumented” in
addition to Bill C-86 in 1993, which “established tougher criteria for asylum, resettlement, and
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detention, including an expanded list of criteria by which an applicant might be determined
inadmissible.”387 The country also temporarily placed a “Right of Landing” fee of $975 per adult
on asylum seekers travelling by boat in 1995, but eliminated this fee in 2000.388 In 2004, Canada
also entered into a “safe third country” provision with the United States, effectively eliminating
asylum seekers’ right to enter by land because they would have had to apply for asylum in the
United States first, which was considered a safe country. Despite all of these provisions and bills,
Canada still received up to 40,000 asylum applicants per year in the 1990s, a number which has
stayed between 20,000 and 40,000 to date.389
Despite Canada’s attempts to restrict asylum seeker applications, the country continued a
robust administration of its refugee resettlement program. The country continued to resettle over
20,000 refugees per year throughout the 1990s, taking in 8,000 Chinese students after the
Tiananmen Square massacre, 20,0000 Somalis from the Somali Civil War, tens of thousands of
Bosnians and 5,000 Kosovars fleeing ethnic persecution in former Yugoslavia, and smaller
movements of ethnic minority refugees from Burma and Myanmar.390 At this point, refugee
resettlement to Canada had remained fairly open, but the events of 9/11 led the Canadian
government to rethink its refugee framework. In 2002, Canada implemented the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act to replace the 1976 Immigration Act. The primary effects of this Act for
refugees and asylum seekers were the creation of the Canadian Border Service Agency and
granting more power to immigration officers, the reduction of government-assisted refugee
program quotas, and the development of an appeal process for negative decisions on refugee
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claims, though the latter part took ten years to fully implement.391 Most of the measures in the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act were to change the measures for economic migrants,
but many of them followed similar guidelines of increasing border security and screenings.
Under Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party leadership, Canada continued to restrict its
refugee policy into the early 2010s. In 2012, the Canadian government passed the “Protecting
Canada’s Immigration System” Act, which shortened timelines for asylum seeker claims, eased
the exclusion of political prisoners and activists from the refugee definition, increased mandatory
detention provisions for asylum seekers, and created a list of “safe countries” from which
Canada would not accept asylum applications.392 Many of these measures were received with
both domestic and international disapproval, especially the mention of some asylum claims as
“bogus” before the final decision on their case is decided. Canada’s conservative government
also cut refugee healthcare benefits in 2015 and refused to set clear resettlement numbers for the
2015 Syrian refugee crisis.393 In effect, the political leanings of Canada’s government directly
impacted the country’s asylum seeker policy, its refugee resettlement policy, and its refugee
service provision.
With the introduction of Justin Trudeau’s more liberal Canadian government in 2015,
many of Canada’s conservative refugee policies of previous years were reversed. First, Canada’s
federal court overturned Bill C-31’s “safe country” provision in 2015.394 Second, Trudeau’s
government reversed refugee healthcare cuts and reinstated healthcare for all refugees within the
country.395 Third, Canada committed fully to its refugee responsibility-sharing for the Syrian
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refugee crisis, resettling 25,000 Syrian refugees by 2016 and becoming the world’s leader for
refugee resettlement by 2018. Fourth, the Canadian government partnered with the UNHCR,
Open Society Foundations, the Giustra Foundation, and the University of Ottawa to create the
Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative, which sought to strengthen other refugee resettlement
programs across the globe. While Canada’s refugee and asylum policy of the last decade has
indicated a mixed reaction to hosting, the country’s overall refugee resettlement policies and
services remain some of the most progressive in the world to this day.
Due to the structure of Canada’s refugee resettlement program, the country resettles
refugees with both government-based distribution and private sponsorship. Privately resettled
refugees are taken in by individuals and organizations willing to host them, so the government
does not track or set targets for the resettlement locations of those refugees. Government-assisted
refugees, however, are resettled in one of 36 communities where Resettlement Assistance
Program (RAP) service provider organizations exist.396 Refugee resettled through Canada’s
shared sponsorship programs like the Blended Visa Office-Referred (BYOR) Program, which
represents a collaboration between the Canadian Government, the UNHCR, and private
sponsors, are also resettled in one of those 36 communities. Many of Canada’s RAP
organizations exist in smaller towns and 13 of them are located in the province of Quebec.397 The
following is a map of Canada’s RAP service provider organizations where government-assisted
refugees are initially resettled:
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Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), a federal department in the
country, is responsible for both refugee applications and resettlement assistance. For Canada’s
Government-Assisted Refugees (GAR) program, “refugees are referred to Canada for
resettlement by the UNHCR or another referral organization” under the conditions of the 1951
Refugee Convention.399 The Resettlement Operations Center in Ottawa (ROC-O) works in
conjunction with the IRCC in order to determine where refugees shall be resettled for the GAR
program based on language, relatives, ethnic, cultural, and religious communities, medical needs,
and available settlement services. ROC-O then consults with Canada’s International Organization
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for Migration in order to make travel arrangements for GARs and shares information with local
IRCC offices to ensure appropriate service provision upon arrival. For GARs in Quebec, the
Quebec provincial government determines its own refugees and selection criteria for resettlement
in 13 communities within their province under the “Canada–Québec Accord relating to
Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens” of 1991.400
After a refugee’s arrival, the Resettlement Assistance Program provides basic services
and programs to government-assisted refugees, including immediate services for four to six
weeks after arrival and financial services for up to one year after entry.401 According to the
IRCC, the RAP’s services extend to greeting at the airport, temporary housing, help with finding
permanent housing, help with registering for mandatory federal and provincial programs,
community orientation services, personal finance help, basic life skills support for high needs
clients, referrals to other refugee programs, a one-time household start-up allowance, and
monthly income support payments “generally based on the prevailing provincial social assistance
rates in the province where the refugees settle.”402 The approximate sum total of financial
assistance for refugees under the RAP is a $905 one time allowance with a $564 loan for house
rental and telephone line deposits, in addition to $567-$751 in monthly assistance as of October
15, 2018.403 The provision of RAP services to GARs is contingent on them staying in the cities
of their service provider organizations, though refugees in Canada have freedom of movement
through the country and freedom to live where they choose after they no longer depend on RAP
services. Refugees in shared sponsorship programs are also entitled to RAP services.
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Furthermore, Canada has instituted an Urgent Persons Program (UPP) to resettle refugees in
urgent need of specialized assistance due to “immediate threats to life, liberty or physical wellbeing” for 100 individuals each year; these refugees are also entitled to RAP service provision.404
For the Privately Sponsored Refugee (PSR) program, the sponsors of refugees, meaning
groups with an IRCC agreement to sponsor refugees, groups of five Canadians or permanent
resident holders, or community sponsors are accountable for service provision to refugees. If
private sponsors have not designated a specific refugee to host, the UNHCR or the Canadian
Visa Office offer hosting recommendations to them. Approximately two-thirds of private
sponsors consist of “organizations that hold agreements with the government for this purpose,
termed sponsorship agreement holders.”405 PSRs generally do not receive access to RAP services
and sponsor parties must take responsibility for refugee service provision. Private sponsor
support for refugees tends to vary in Canada because sponsors must fulfill required services
under their PSR agreement, but can choose to provide any additional services that they wish.406
The Canadian government also dictates that PSRs must receive a minimum of social assistance
and income support equal to that of RAP support. Private sponsors must provide “the refugees
with care, lodging, settlement assistance, and support for the duration of the sponsorship period”,
which typically lasts for 12 months, but can carry on for up to three years under special
circumstances.407 While sponsors involved in shared sponsorship programs receive government
financial assistance to cover the costs of sponsorship, private sponsors are expected to cover the
costs of refugee sponsorship themselves ($13,500-$33,700, depending on family size), but they

Ahmad, “Refugee Law and Policy: Canada.”
Ibid.
406
Wilkinson and Garcea, “The Economic Integration of Refugees in Canada,” 7.
407
Ahmad, “Refugee Law and Policy: Canada”
404
405

Identifying Better Refugee Policies

Rook 138

do receive some in-kind gifts and donations from the government for assistance ($6,000-$9,600
plus clothing, furniture, start-up, school, and food support).408
Outside of RAP services, the Canadian government provides GARs, PSRS, and refugees
in shared sponsorship programs with additional services for integration and well-being. The
government has made refugees available for the Immigrant Loans Program if they need
additional assistance during their travel to the country. The Immigrant Loans Program helps to
“cover the costs of medical examination before departing for Canada, acquisition of travel
documents such as passports, and transportation to Canada.”409 The program takes its roots from
the Assisted Passage Loan Agreement in 1951. Additionally, refugees may receive healthcare
coverage from the Interim Federal Health Care Program (IFCHP) until they are eligible for
provincial or territorial healthcare plans.410 Thereby, even non-government-assisted refugees may
receive some government support to ease their transition to living in the country.
Canada also standardizes access to permanent residency and naturalization in the country.
As soon as the Canadian government determiners that a newcomer is a refugee, they are instantly
eligible to apply for permanent residence in Canada as a “Protected Person.” After acquiring
permanent resident status in Canada, refugees must fulfill a few additional requirements before
they can become citizens. The requirements for citizenship are: living in Canada for three of the
five previous years, being a permanent resident for two years, providing proof of proficiency in
English or French (to Canadian Language Benchmark 4 in Listening and Speaking), passing the
citizenship knowledge test, and paying the $400 application fee (or $100 for minors).411
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Furthermore, refugees may count half of their time as a Person of Protected Status into their
three year residence requirement and they may request an application fee waiver if the
application for citizenship is cost-prohibitive.412 While the approval of Canadian citizenship
applications often involves long wait times, Canada’s process for refugee naturalization is one of
the more forgiving ones as a result of the 2017 Citizenship Act. According to the UNHCR, 89%
of refugees in Canada become citizens.413
Both GARs and PSRs also receive access to housing in Canada, but in different ways. In
PSRs, sponsors move refugees directly into permanent accommodations, while the RAP houses
GARs in temporary accommodations like reception centers or hotels.414 GARs also receive
assistance in finding permanent housing, although they don’t receive financial assistance in
acquiring it. The Transatlantic Council on Migration reports that rising rents in Canada, a lack of
housing for larger families in cities, and insufficient financial resources to obtain adequate
housing in the country have made it increasingly more difficult for GARs to pay rent for
permanent housing while also needing to pay off transportation loans for their arrival.415 This
demonstrates that in some instances, private sponsorship serves Canadian refugees better than
the government.
From statistical data in recent years, it appears that this holds true for refugee
employment as well. While refugees in Canada possess the right to work, different types of
refugees possess different outcomes for employment. According to a 2007 evaluation by
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Citizenship and Immigration Canada, PSRs enter the labor market faster than GARs, they are
more likely to obtain paid employment, and their earnings are higher than those of GARs.416
GARs are not helped by the fact that the “level of financial support GARs receive is reduced
once they obtain employment earnings equal to or greater than 50 percent of their RAP
guaranteed income support.”417 This gap between refugee employment narrows after three years,
but the personalized support provided by private sponsors seems to provide for faster refugee
self-sufficiency than RAPs.
Nevertheless, refugees in Canada manage to contribute significantly to economic growth
in the country and sometimes obtain better employment outcomes than native Canadians. While
more recent refugees to Canada tend to experience difficulties in entering the labor market and
initially rely more on social assistance payments than native Canadians, the Transatlantic
Council on Migration reports that refugees who have stayed in Canada for over five years can
obtain similar employment outcomes to native Canadians.418 Canadian employers seem initially
skeptical of refugee work credentials, Canadian job-matching policy and internship programs
have done an adequate job of providing refugees with employment. According to the UNHCR,
the refugee unemployment rate in Canada is 9% compared to the 6% of native Canadians,
refugees pay more in income tax than they receive in government benefits, 51% of Canadian
refugees are employed in high-skilled jobs, and 14.4% of refugees who have stayed in Canada
for over ten years are entrepreneurs compared to 12.3% native Canadians.419 Clearly Canada’s
refugee employment system is providing positive outcomes for refugees, despite some
unevenness in its administration.

Wilkinson and Garcea, “The Economic Integration of Refugees in Canada,” 17.
Ibid.
418
Ibid, 9-10.
419
“Are Refugees Good for Canada?,” 5, 7, and 9.
416
417

Identifying Better Refugee Policies

Rook 141

Canada also recognizes refugees’ right to primary and secondary education. The
Canadian school system attempts to accommodate refugee children as they “fit” in to the existing
structures of the country’s educational system, but this often leads to them being placed into
grades lower than that of their age group.420 Because individuals in Canada over the age of 21
must pay for secondary education, refugees placed into the education system into a lower grade
could suffer from financial barriers to education in the country.421 While tertiary education in
Canada is not free for refugees, the Student Refugee Program (SRP) has developed in the
country as a Sponsorship Agreement Holder with the IRCC to partner with over 95 campuses
and help over 2,000 young refugees to gain college education in the country since 1978.422
Young refugees come into Canada relying on the country’s programs and services to make them
self-sufficient and according to the UNHCR in 2016, the country is successful in providing them
with those opportunities, as “refugees who arrived in Canada as children have a higher
completion rate of high school, college, university and graduate degrees compared to children
born in Canada.”423
Furthermore, the Canadian government gives refugees access to the same mainstream
public services that Canadian nationals may access, such as “the employment insurance program,
social assistance programs, and various pension programs.”424 While GARs are made aware of
these services prior to and after their arrival, PSRs do not always receive knowledge about
services for which they might be eligible from the government. Private sponsors have no
formalized process for welcoming refugees and according to a report by the Transatlantic
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Council on migration, “many settlement service providers report that some refugees experience
significant problems accessing appropriate services because they are provided inaccurate
information by those close to them.”425 Private sponsors are given information and resources to
aid PSRs upon arrival and PSRs also receive the full-time aid of volunteers in their first few
weeks, but the general procedure for PSR arrival appears to require more standardization.
The Canadian refugee service provision has begun to suffer from their increased refugee
intake as well. Between 2015 and 2018, Canada accepted over 50,000 Syrian refugees and
recently resettled refugees began to encounter long waiting lists and barriers to services like
language courses upon their entrance to the country.426 According to the Leibniz Institute for
Social Sciences in 2016, “British Columbia, for instance, currently has over 5,000 people on its
waiting list for English language classes.”427 The Canadian refugee resettlement program has
clearly suffered after attempting to triple its refugee resettlement numbers in one year during
2016 without increasing its program capacity.
However comprehensive Canada’s refugee resettlement program is, the country’s
programs for asylees are lacking. Asylees in Canada typically receive no support or funding from
the RAP in Canada unless they “have been identified as refugees with special needs and who
have been admitted to Canada as government-assisted refugees.”428 Asylees recognized by the
Immigration and Refugee Board in Canada receive no special income assistance and must
depend on general government benefits for assistance, if they qualify for it.429 Furthermore,
asylum seekers that enter Canada by land face deportation to the United States due to Canada’s
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“Safe Third Country” agreement with the US, a measure that might lead asylum seekers to be
further detained or deported to Mexico under recent US asylum policy. Asylum seekers
attempting to enter Canada in the coming years must be wary of Canadian asylee services and
policy, as the current Canadian government has refused to repeal restrictive policies against
asylum seekers signed into law by the past conservative government, despite continuing to
support measures for refugee resettlement.
The following table shows the Canada’s relevant signed international legislation on
refugees and asylum seekers to date:
Legislation Year
Implemented
1946

1947
1951
1962
1969

1976

1979
1985/89

1988
1993
2002

Legislation Name
Passage of the Order-InCouncil on displaced family
members
Institution of the Displaced
Persons Movement
Enactment of the Assisted
Passage Loan Agreement
Passage of Order-InCouncil PC 1962-86
Ratification of the 1951
Refugee Convention and the
1967 Refugee Protocol
Passage of the Immigration
Act of 1976

Description of Legislation

Allowed Canadian citizens to welcome
displaced family members from Europe
after World War 2
Created ad-hoc agreement to selectively
welcome post-World War 2 refugees
Developed a travel loan system for new
refugees in Canada
Eliminated race as a factor in migrant
acceptance, replacing it with “skill”
Established the rights of refugees and
removed geographical and temporal
limitations on them
Matched Canada’s refugee definition to
that of the UN, created the Refugee Status
Advisory Committee, and developed the
country’s refugee resettlement program
Institution of the Private
Created Canada’s program for private
Sponsorship Program
refugee sponsorship
Development and Institution Created Canada’s system for asylum
of the Immigration and
seeker application processing
Refugee Board
Passage of Bill C-84
Created new “detention and deterrence”
measures for asylum seekers
Passage of Bill C-86
Expanded Canada’s inadmissibility criteria
for asylum seekers
Implementation of the
Created the Border Service Agency,
Immigration and Refugee
strengthened the role of immigration
Protection Act
officers, reduced refugee quotas, and
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2004

2012

Institution of the “Safe
Third Country” Agreement
Between the United States
and Canada
Passage of Bill C-31 (the
“Protecting Canada’s
Immigration System” Act)
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developed an appeal process for negative
refugee claim decisions
Disallowed asylum seeker applications for
those travelling to the Canada by land if
they had not applied in the USA first
Shortened asylum seeker timelines, eased
exclusion of political prisoners and
activists, increased asylum detention
provisions, and (temporarily) created a list
of “safe countries”

While the Canadian refugee resettlement program and asylum processing system are
imperfect, the country’s programs and policy remain some of the most progressive in the world
and obey international guidelines. According to this thesis, Canada does not violate any of the
Articles of the 1951 Refugee Convention examined by this thesis. However, the intricacies
involved in Canada’s multi-faceted refugee resettlement program require more nuance for the
administration of services to PSRs and GARs, as clarified by the following recommendations:
First, the PSR program should mandate that private sponsors attend standardized
information sessions about available integration services such as language and vocational
training in their signed agreements. Doing so would ensure that PSRs receive the necessary
programs that would maximize their opportunities for self-sufficiency.
Second, the GAR program should include a fund for permanent housing acquisition for
large families as part of its program administration. Considering the deficiencies in Canada’s
current housing market, refugees need assurances that they can live outside of their initial
temporary housing if they are to feed their children, repay travel loans, and pay rent before many
of them have access to steady income.
Third, the Canadian government should ensure that refugees in Canada have free access
to secondary education regardless of age. Refugees should not be deprived of receiving equal
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educational opportunities in their new homes due to age restrictions based on their past
education.
Fourth, the Canadian government ought to increase its program capacity to ensure that all
refugees can receive the integration-based services guaranteed to them. Canada’s recent
increased intake of refugees should be accompanied by an increase in the number and size of
government-assisted refugee programs
Fifth, Canada should provide GAR program services to asylees to ensure that they have
the same chance at self-sufficiency as resettled refugees, as their rights under the 1951 Refugee
Convention have been recognized.
Finally, Canada ought to do everything in its power to encourage other countries to do
their part in international responsibility-sharing. Canada’s contributions to refugee resettlement
have been admirable, but other countries must emulate their example if the world is to alleviate
the current refugee crisis.
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Conclusion

Every country in the world possesses its own unique history and challenges of asylumseeker admission and refugee resettlement. Haven countries like Uganda and Kenya host the
majority of the world’s asylees and generally experience minimal involvement in resettlement.
Coastal nations like Italy face their own unique challenges in accepting seafaring asylum seekers
while staying involved in refugee resettlement. Germany and Hungary, as countries in central
and eastern Europe, are encountering new challenges in European refugee resettlement and the
extent to which they take on the responsibilities of new crises. The United States and Canada, as
historic leaders in global refugee resettlement, endure the pressure of setting global standards for
both resettlement and program administration to refugees. These geographic factors heavily
influence both the roles fulfilled and policies required by each country.
Similarly, the resources, past immigration laws, and current governments of each country
also inform the policies they need to provide for the self-sufficiency of refugees and fulfill their
international obligations. Not every country possesses Uganda’s territorial capacity to provide
farmland for incoming refugee families, Canada’s domestic goodwill to privately sponsor and
resettle refugees, or the United States’ financial ability to administer grant funding and facilitate
labor market integration for refugees. Conversely, it is not realistic for Kenya to transition
directly from denying refugees the right to work to fully integrating them into the economy
without intermediate actions. Italy and Hungary require transformations of both domestic
political will and international enforcement of legislation in order to effectively grant refugees
their rights. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate a wide array of policy recommendations that
can provoke legislators in other countries to rethink their current refugee programs and reaffirm
national commitments to global burden sharing. To summarize, here are the suggested policy
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recommendations for Uganda, Kenya, Germany, Italy, Hungary, the United States of America,
and Canada:
Uganda
1. Develop comprehensive vocational training programs for refugees working outside of
agricultural communities
2. Invest in improving access to basic services in refugee settlements
3. The Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) must work in conjunction with international
actors to produce more detailed and complete records for resource tracking of the
Ugandan refugee program
a. funders of the new resource tracking program should also establish policies and
procedures to hold grantee states accountable, and provide training on their
accounting methods/software to ensure that the funds are properly reaching
refugee programs
4. Local communities must be more closely involved in refugee program decisions
5. The African Union must collaborate with Uganda to develop a more cohesive policy for
refugee resettlement and incentivize burden-sharing within Africa
Kenya
1. Enact a new Refugee bill, which will:
a. establish a more lenient basis for granting movement passes to Kenyan refugees
b. remove the component of making a “substantive contribution to Kenya’s
development” from its naturalization requirements
c. administer services uniformly to refugees across the country

Identifying Better Refugee Policies

Rook 148

d. include provisions for improved education to refugees in camps through Kiswahili
Language Learner (KLL) programs and access to secondary education that does
not require refugees seeking movement passes and forfeiting access to aid
e. establish more settlements like Kalobeyei within the country to allow the
economic participation and gender equality of refugees in Kenya
f. encourage refugee departments of the Kenyan government to work more closely
with the UNHCR, NGOs, and local refugee networks to develop a more
comprehensive system of data collection for refugees within the country
2. Stop labelling refugees as members of Al-Shabaab or terror threats to the country
3. Stop trying to deport refugees and close existing camps
Germany
1. Remove the part of its Basic Law amended by the “Asylum Compromise” (in section
16a) that defines a list of “safe countries” from which asylum seekers cannot apply for
asylum in Germany
2. Allow refugees to relocate to other areas of the country after their initial residence permit
3. Standardize program administration as well as the criteria for granting work permits and
settlement permits across regions
a. create a federal to oversee and standardize regional policies and ensure fair
practice for refugees
4. Reinforce its language program administration to ensure that all refugees stand a
reasonable chance of attending higher education or obtaining jobs
5. Create more employment programs and networks for unskilled workers on top of its
existing vocational training programs
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6. Continue to work via international platforms and incentives in the EU to establish an
equitable responsibility-sharing system for refugees across Europe
Italy
1. Enact the 2017 National Integration Plan in its entirety
2. Reform access to Universal Basic Income for refugees
3. Repeal the 2018 decree, “Urgent measures on international protection, immigration, and
public security”
4. Repeal the 2019 decree, “Urgent measures concerning public security and order”
5. Work in conjunction with the UNHCR, International Organization for Migration (IOM),
the Italian Red Cross, and Save the Children to reinstate the Praesidium Project
6. Abolish the “Hotspot Approach” and improve the quality of reception facilities
Hungary
1. The United Nations, the European Union, and national government bodies must hold the
Hungarian government accountable for its behavior toward refugees, potentially
removing Hungary’s EU voting rights
2. Repeal all stated federal asylum decrees since 2015
3. Establish government-created integration services that provide for the self-sufficiency of
refugees in the country, like signing into law a new Refugee Law that creates language,
financial literacy, educational, and employment programs for refugees in coordination
with NGOs for service provision and information-gathering
The United States of America
1. Repeal the 2017 screening restrictions for refugee resettlement from “high-risk”
countries
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2. The President of the United States ought to raise the admissions ceiling for refugee
resettlement to that of the pre-Trump era and adjust executive parameters for determining
the ceiling
3. Repeal the 1990 Lautenberg Amendment along with the 2004 Specter Amendment
4. Refrain from instituting additional discriminatory travel bans, like the “Muslim ban”
5. Amend the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act to
remove the power of deportation from immigration officers and ensure that asylum
seekers receive a fair trial in the United States
6. Repeal the Migrant Protection Protocols and refrain from deporting asylum seekers to
Mexico as they await asylum processing in the United States
7. Pass a law that formally prevents family separation at the U.S.-Mexican border
8. The Department of State’s Resettlement and Placement program should either contribute
more funding to VOLAGs in order to provide integration services for refugees beyond
the initial 30 day period or the ORR should to increase funding to state refugee
departments
9. The ORR ought to remove employment as a requirement for refugees to receive
additional skills training and the agency must fund the entirety of vocational training
programs
10. Standardize refugee program provision across the states
Canada
1.

The PSR program should mandate that private sponsors attend standardized information
sessions about available integration services such as language and vocational training in
their signed agreements
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2. The GAR program should include a fund for permanent housing acquisition for large
families as part of its program administration
3. Ensure that refugees in Canada have free access to secondary education regardless of age
4. Increase program capacity to ensure that all refugees can receive the integration-based
services guaranteed to them
5. Provide GAR program services to asylees to ensure that they have the same chance at
self-sufficiency as resettled refugees
6. Make every effort to incentivize other countries fulfill their obligations for international
responsibility-sharing
In the words of Betts and Collier, developing effective refugee policies and programs
requires a fine balancing act of the “headless heart” and the “heartless head.” Every nation has
the duty to help those fleeing persecution, but the measures to accomplish that must be realistic.
Today, the world contains more forcibly displaced people than ever before. The solution to
repatriating, locally integrating, or resettling those in need of assistance is neither shirking
international obligations, nor admitting all displaced persons without the ability to provide for
their self-sufficiency. Instead, rational and well-informed adjustment of policies by states,
steadfast support of service provision by NGOs and the private sector, and unyielding advocacy
of international organizations for collective action can create a more effective global refugee
regime. In the past few decades, multilateral coordination through the International Conference
on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) to provide durable solutions for Central American
displaced persons and the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) to resettle Indochinese refugees
has proven successful. With all of these measures in mind, solving the Middle Eastern refugee
crisis, one of the most severe humanitarian issues of our time, becomes an attainable goal.
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